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“It's every man's dream to find a short route to his heart's 
desire. If the major dreams long enough, he'll find it1” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 - Robert Young in the character of Langdon Towne in the 1940 film Northwest Passage.  
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1. Introduction 
 
he Northwest Passage is a still partly ice-covered sea route
2
 through the 
Canadian Arctic Archipelago linking the Atlantic and Pacific oceans 
together. 
The Passage has been somewhat of an obsession for many an explorer and 
merchant marine throughout history. First described in the 15
th
 century by European 
colonial powers, a hypothetical trade route to the north and west of the Americas has 
been a much sought after scenario. However, it wasn`t until 1906 that the route was 
actually conquered by sea
3
 when Norwegian Roald Amundsen led his converted 
fishing vessel Gjøa through the Passage in just about three years. Since then the 
journey has been made by many others as well.  
What make the Passage take on greater political importance today are the 
projections about tomorrow. That is, that the expected outcome of global warming 
will be a receding ice cap which in turn will open up the Passage for a whole host of 
activities. A navigable Northwest Passage would drastically decrease time estimates 
and fuel costs for ships that are now making the trek from ocean to ocean through the 
Panama or Suez canals
4
. It would also open up vast areas for petroleum and mineral 
exploration. In short, there are huge potential effects to be expected; particularly 
economic and trade related, but also environmental and security related ones. And the 
big melt has already begun.  
No wonder then that the Passage has slowly but surely moved from mostly 
being a famed legend in exploration milieus to becoming a seemingly hotter and 
hotter potato in high politics. The main driving force behind this heat has undoubtedly 
been and continues to be a long-standing dispute between the United States of 
America (US) and Canada over the legal status of the Passage.   
 
                                                 
2
 Although it is common to use the singular form, there are in fact several navigational possibilities 
along the way. Based on the known voyages through the Passage there seems to be (at least) seven 
major routes, although not all are equally navigable (Pharand 2007:29) 
3
 Others, like sir John Franklin and sir Robert McClure, had traversed the route before, but with 
varying degree of luck. Franklin perished in the attempt and McClure relied on dog-sled for significant 
parts of the journey.  
4
 The distance between the major oceans would be reduced by about 2000 nautical miles, which 
equates to about one week of transit in shipping.  
 
T 
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In the background lies the United Nations Convention on the Laws of the Sea 
(UNCLOS) – the comprehensive legal framework which currently has some 160 
parties
5
. It deals with all aspects of ocean governance and usage, among other things 
providing for general rules and guidelines, defining individual states` rights and 
responsibilities and establishing a system for evaluating sovereignty claims and 
adjudicating in such matters. It was nine years in the making and represented a 
massive undertaking – by some deemed the second-most impressive international 
accord ever, only surpassed by the creation of the United Nations. Although being one 
of its prime instigators and having served as its main facilitator during the 
negotiations, the US has yet to ratify the treaty, as one of very, very few states. It has 
signed, but not ratified. It is not a matter of the US having to alter its policies 
profoundly when/if acceding to the UNCLOS. It has voluntarily complied with the 
tone and spirit of the convention since the early 1980s. What has held the Americans 
from ratifying is the forceful opposition from a small group of Republican senators 
who are espousing a rather stable feature in parts of the US populous; profound 
skepticism toward pooling sovereignty with others for some common purpose and the 
perceived way in which such multilateral ventures diminute American autonomy, 
particularly when those ventures are sweeping and serve to challenge core principles. 
This opposition persists, even though ratification is favored by almost everybody else 
in the political sphere across the party fault line and even though the objections of 
President Reagan – a hero to many of these fringe senators – in the 1980s had the 
direct effect of leading to a package of US-friendly concessions in the negotiation 
product commonly called the `94 Agreement.  
 
I wish to explore these two topics in conjunction; US non-ratification of the UNCLOS 
and its dispute with Canada over the legal status of the Northwest Passage. 
They are two separate issues, but they sometimes join and become parts of one and 
the same. This represents a challenge and a caveat. But it also represents a possibility 
for eliciting interesting contextual knowledge.  
 
Specifically, I pose the following questions: 
 
                                                 
5
 159 countries and the European Union as of May 2010 (United Nations 2010a)  
  
10 
1: Given that the issue is not a partisan one and that the US secured important 
concessions in the `94 Agreement, why has it nevertheless not yet ratified the 
UNCLOS? 
 
2: What role can the Northwest Passage dispute be said to have played? 
 
3: Going forward, what are the prospects of change? 
 
I intend to confirm that vis-à-vis the pro`s and con`s of an accession to the UNCLOS, 
not only would a fair and reasonable look at the evidence seem to favor US interests 
at present – it would also seem to provide the Americans with a set of rules and 
procedures to peacefully claim its current and future interests in the increasingly 
contagious High North. And, unlike some of the fiercest UNCLOS critics, I do not see 
an accession to the UNCLOS as reeking havoc to the American superpower status. 
The US may thus continue to reward its allies, to punish its enemies and to lecture all 
even post ratification, should it so please. Fine. But what then of the seemingly strong 
counter force? I will show that although the nature of the opposing forces may be 
framed in all kinds of ways – environmental, procedural or unilateralist being but 
three examples – the essence and foundation of those forces are best identified by 
delving into the formative effects of the American sense of self and its ideological 
underpinnings.  
The Northwest Passage dispute is a part of the puzzle that is the High North and thus 
it plays at the very least a general role. More specifically, I intend to thoroughly detail 
how it is that although Canada is forceful in asserting its nordicitè, the US has a very 
good hand and, crucially, one which would likely become even better if it was to 
accede to the UNCLOS and gain access to the mandatory settlement mechanisms 
which would end the decades-long dispute.  
 
At face value it might seem that the relevance of this thesis is potentially short-lived. 
The US Senate could indeed ratify the UNCLOS before the November elections
6
 and 
thus render certain parts passé. However, I would not bet my life savings on that 
happening. And regardless; some of the features that are illuminated are of general 
                                                 
6
 In which approx. a third of the Senate seats are in play.  
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interest for the student of US politics. The road forward will to a large extent depend 
on how the Obama administration prioritizes and organizes its treaty portfolio. There 
will always be issues crowding the plate, whether it would be financial crisis, health 
reform or oil spills. But it is in essence down to choice – choosing to spend the 
[considerable] political capital necessary to quell the detractors and see through an 
accession.   
 
 
 
1.1 The climatology 
 
I will steer almost totally clear of discussing the climatology of the Passage, except 
for occasional usage in anecdotal form. This means that I am presupposing an ice-free 
Passage at some point in the future and not letting the inherently uncertain timeframe 
interfere significantly with the analysis
7
. Those interested in the ice condition imagery 
and updated climate models of the area can visit the National Snow and Ice Data 
Center
8
 or see the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment
9
.   
 
The process of how the Arctic ice vanishes so quickly is simple enough; heat-
reflecting ice melts and turns into heat-absorbing water which in turn accelerates the 
entire process. What one gets is in other words a constantly multiplied trend towards 
less and less ice, ceteris paribus, and an ice cap melting from below instead of from 
above. A negative spiral or feedback loop, if you will. Polar amplification is the 
technical term. It is the reason why the Arctic is warming faster than any other region 
on Earth.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
7
 Short-term predictions vary greatly, but longer term predictions are unison in depicting an ice-free 
Passage by the middle or end of this century. At the recent Copenhagen climate change summit, 
computer modeling suggested the Arctic Ocean may be nearly ice-free by the summer of 2014.  
8
 http://nsidc.org/arcticseaicenews/  
9
 http://www.amap.no/acia/  
  
12 
Figure 1: Ice-melt projections (minimum extent) 
 
 
(UNEP/GRID 2010) 
 
 
1.2 The methodology 
 
There has been a slight piece of paranoia that has followed the process from the very 
get-go right up until completion. “What if the US Senate ratifies the UNCLOS next 
week?” “Luckily” that has not happened.   
That paranoia does however illustrate a more important methodological challenge; the 
difficulty of aiming and shooting at a moving target. Because that is essentially what 
the subject matter amounts to – a moving target. I have been forced to think up 
possible alternate plans, but there is no denying the fact that a ratification in, say, 
February would have hurt the thesis and the process at large seeing as though I began 
as early as in September of last year.  
This thesis rests primarily on the use of secondary sources. There exists a 
multitude of literature covering the legal specificities of the UNCLOS and quite a lot 
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on the dispute settlement mechanisms it contains. Much of this has however been 
rather useless for my purposes, which I quickly discovered. The little that has been 
written on the US/UNCLOS-relationship is often pitted in ideological terms and/or is 
of the rather outdated sort. That means that much of the basis is a smorgasbord of 
scholarly articles, conference papers, official reports and journalistic exposès.  
I had initially planned to complement the secondary data sources with explorative 
open-ended interviews with key individuals in the field. However, I scrapped this plan 
once I realized that the main challenge did not lie in collecting the data as much as it 
did in the structuring and de-ideologization of it – and this I felt had to begin and end 
with me, myself and I. It has thus been more of a cognitive (sic) process than I had 
expected. Instead, I ended up consulting key experts on select parts of the thesis in the 
draft review process. That means that Professor Erik Røsæg, dr. Alexander Proelss 
and Svein Melby, to name three examples, have commented on sections 4.2, 4.2 and 
4.7, respectively, and spurred small changes.   
My own line of reasoning takes on counterfactual tendencies at times. Or to be 
fair, counterfactual is a slightly misleading term, seeing as though what I am referring 
to is often not a causal event that has occurred, but rather an expected though 
inevitably uncertain future causal event. Qualified hypothetical speculation is perhaps 
more fitting. Nevertheless, these thought experiments might not go down too well 
with everybody, and certainly make for poorer reliability in that it makes it more 
difficult a study to replicate. Although it cannot alleviate the latter concern, I have 
made sure to pay attention to the internal semantic logic and stringency of the 
arguments. Correct use of citation also plays a part in that context, but attention to 
citations and references is generally a given in the social sciences.  
Although I have a multitude of sources, I do not rely on many different types 
of sources. I have not conducted formal interviews, I have not been in the field and 
stepped onto the polar ice myself, and I have not dabbled with quantitative measures.  
One could therefore question whether or not data triangulation has occurred. 
Strengthening the validity and reliability of the thesis is something which is always 
desirable, but in as far as the measure of it is how well one measures the same 
phenomenon from different angles I would say that I nonetheless conform to the 
criterion set by Yin (2003:99) and others.  
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In what is essentially a case-study design
10
, my aim is to dive into the deep 
end and thoroughly examine the subject matter in order to unearth the causal patterns 
and context which will enable me to answer the “why” and “what”s in the 
introduction. While choosing a case study approach serves me well in doing just that, 
it hurts the external validity. After all, a case study approach goes deep and cannot go 
wide at the same time. This means that the lessons drawn about, say, US reluctance to 
tying itself to international accords will most likely not be, and perhaps cannot be, 
extrapolated to other cases and said to be representative in general. This type of 
problem is something which “forever haunts case study research” (Gerring 2007:43). 
It has not, I must admit, haunted me though. My goal has not so much been to pave 
the way for extrapolation as it has been to attempt to answer the ponderings 
represented in the research questions. The gut-feeling and vantage point was always 
the prospect of there being something special about the American relationship to the 
laws of the sea. To then expect great out-of-case relevance would thus be an odd 
notion.   
 
 
1.3 The general plan of the thesis 
 
The introductory first chapter has sought to set the tone and familiarize the reader 
ever so slightly with the topics that will be explored and, of course, introduce the 
specific research questions. Chapter two lays out the theoretical construct that will 
inform the rest of the thesis. The three main tracks that are launched are loosely based 
on the perceived relevance of the three I`s; interests, ideas and identities - whilst the 
theory of complex interdependence is employed more as a schematic background 
which will inform the world view chosen.  
Chapter three is a historical background chapter which seeks to paint a comprehensive 
picture of the regulation of the oceans, first in general and then with particular 
emphasis on how the Americans has related to it. It has purposely been presented in a 
chronological order so as to lead up to the issues dealt with in this thesis.  
Chapter four is the main analytical bulk and where subjective interpretation and 
reasoning to a larger extent will be injected. It deals with the make-up of the 
                                                 
10
 John Gerring`s (2007:37) minimal definition claims a case study approach to be “an intensive study 
of a single unit or a small number of units (the cases)”.  
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UNCLOS; the Northwest Passage dispute in more detail; the legal arguments 
employed by the two parties in the dispute; the US-Canadian relations; the arguments 
of the American UNCLOS opponents, how they are to be interpreted and the weight 
they carry; the importance of the Reagan era in that context; the hold-up in the Senate, 
and finally, some tentative thoughts on what Obama might do during his tenure. The 
fifth and sixth chapters seek to take a step back, pull the threads together and offer 
some concluding remarks.  
 
I will be reverting back and forth between focus on the Northwest Passage dispute 
and the UNCLOS. This influences the rhythm a bit. However, it is done for a reason 
and I hope the reader will have no major problems in keeping track of the argument.  
 
    
2. Theoretical basis 
 
t is impossible to view global politics, and much less to analyze it, without 
employing some preconceived assumptions. It is the inherent process by which 
one makes sense of a complex world. Often this is an implicit process. When 
laying out the theoretical construct for this thesis, my aim is to make it explicit, or 
rather, as explicit as I can.  
To reiterate; the aim of the thesis is to detail how come the US has yet to ratify 
the UNCLOS despite considerable push factors, account for the role of the Northwest 
Passage dispute, and offer some tentative thoughts on the road which lies ahead.   
 
To do so I have chosen a two-pronged approach.  
First, I introduce three main explanatory tracks that evolve around the three I`s; 
interests, ideas and identities. Each of these bears with them a potential to help frame 
and structure the arguments. One is positivist in nature, whereas the other two are 
more of the constructivist sort.  
Second, I identify one particular theory, that of complex interdependence, which I 
would pose has a place in shedding light on the themes explored in this thesis. First 
among the reasons for this is the mere fact that ocean policy was singled out by the 
theory`s authors as one of the issue areas which seemed to be functioning in a way 
I 
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most similar to the conditions of complex interdependence. Applying the theory thus 
ought to make sense. If the explanatory tools it provides seem inadequate when 
applied to my subject matter, then something is awry. If the fit is good however, they 
will bring structure and context to the thesis.  
 
 
2.1 Material interests 
 
“Greater access to the Arctic Ocean potentially threatens United States’ 
national interests in the region. Access to the United States’ natural resources, 
specifically oil and natural gas, and to its territory and critical infrastructure must be 
protected” – Lt.col. T.R.McCarthy jr., US Marine Corps 
(McCarthy jr. 2009) 
 
The first main track is that household concept within realist circles; material interests. 
It certainly plays a part in other theoretical milieus as well
11
, but it is mainly from 
realist thinkers one gets its most typical interpretations (Mingst 2008:chapter 3). 
Material (national) interests are at the basic levels understood as the protection of 
territory and sovereignty. In practice, though, it is construed in much wider ways. In 
realist traditions it is equal to, or defined in terms of, the pursuit of power. The means 
by which this is done can vary greatly, but the acquisition of wealth, economic growth 
and military might are certainly among the most important determinants of power. 
That is not to say that power is hard power alone. Softer forms of power obviously 
have roles to play. There exists a complex relationship between the two of which I 
won`t go into detail here, apart from saying that the creator of the term soft power has 
himself on numerous occasions detailed how allusive and fuzzy the list of material 
(national) interests becomes when hard and soft power are combined
12
. Depending on 
one`s theoretical inclinations, barrels of oil, number of troops or superiority of 
technology can be matters of US national interest just as well as human rights 
concerns, adherence to democracy or generous aid schemes can.  
                                                 
11
 A liberal thinker would most likely list a whole lot of material (national) interests, a radical would 
probably tie it to the interests of the ruling class and a strict constructivist would perhaps view the 
notion of a national interests as equivalent to whatever typified the people.  
12
 See Joseph S. Nye jr. in, say, http://www.theatlantic.com/issues/91jul/nye.htm or in Soft Power: The 
Means to Success in World Politics from 2004.  
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The dividing line seems to be the propensity to which one is willing to inject morality 
into the mix. Realists are generally unwilling to do so. They tend to want to view 
national interests as equivalent to strategic interests, thus disregarding things like 
human rights concerns, adherence to democracy and aid schemes as noble but (in the 
power game) inconsequential interests. Insofar as states are utility-maximizing 
rational actors, then, the core expectancy is that state preferences will be determined 
by evaluating which material interests are considered to be at stake in the issue at 
hand. This is how foreign policy sometimes can appear quite separate from ideology.  
 
2.2 Ideology 
 
.. ideas have meaning for social actors. What people mean by their actions depends 
on what ideas inform their thinking. These include what they think valuable or worth 
striving for – “ideology”, in brief (Hollis & Smith 1991:70) 
 
Ideology is obviously an important main track in and of itself, and one that should be 
included. An ideology is generally described as a set of ideals, principles, symbols, 
doctrines and myths that prescribes how society should be built up and work. Michael 
H. Hunt (2009:xi) has in the highly regarded “Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy” 
offered another rather wide definition and calls it an interrelated set of convictions or 
assumptions that reduces the complexities of a particular slice of reality to easily 
comprehensible terms and suggests appropriate ways of dealing with that reality. 
These ideologies manifest themselves in the parties and the placement within the 
party structure. The party system in the US is well-known, comprising of two large 
dominating parties, each of which contain lots of different ideological streams but still 
exudes and embraces mainly one particular set of ideals each.  
Like Hunt, I would most certainly expect ideology to play a role in US foreign policy, 
but unlike him I would not want to specify
13
 it any more than necessary. Instead, I 
want to keep it at the partisan level and focus on the role the ideational forces has on 
                                                 
13
 Hunt essentially launches a new ideology which he claims has been underlying all the twists and 
turns of 20
th
 century US foreign policy. It, according to him, comprises of three core elements; a zeal to 
promote liberty abroad, a hierarchical racial (and cultural) view of the world, and America`s ironic, 
hostile and distrusting view of revolutions and upheavals abroad.  
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state behavior. One core, and very basic, expectancy is that there will be significant 
changes as one administration replaces another.  
 
2.3 Identity 
 
“Foreign policy is the face a nation wears to the world. The minimal motive is the 
same for all states – the protection of national integrity and interest. But the manner 
in which a state practices foreign policy is greatly affected by national peculiarities. 
The United States is not exempt from these unimpeachable generalities” (Schlesinger 
1983:1) 
 
The third main track is, like the second, influenced by constructivist theories. I have 
called it identity
14
, but could just as well have dubbed it character. It refers to the 
collective sense of self, which is generally shared by the people of a nation
15
. It gets 
its constructivist tilt in the sense that following this track would mean accepting that 
key structures in international relations are not material, but instead inter-subjective
16
 
and socially contingent (Mingst 2008:94-95). I am, in other words, referring to an 
American identity - something which is somehow innate to inhabitants of the US, 
irrespective of partisan color, physical color, age or any other variable.  
Have social circumstances and historical processes paved the way for US-specific 
cultural norms and values which might go a significant way in explaining policy 
positions? It takes little knowledge of the US to be able to offer an affirmative nod to 
that question. After all, the nation was founded by people eager to create for 
themselves new identities and said people were careful to construct its Constitution as 
not to hinder the development of an American identity in time
17
.  
I am thus posing that it exists and that it might matter. If it indeed does, identity is the 
element of the three which would speak for stability in a position over time
18
 - merely 
because it is an element unaffected by the party adherence variable. It should be 
                                                 
14
 See the writings of Alexander Wendt.  
15
 One can obviously break it down into even smaller parts, but as one moves from the national level 
downwards it becomes steadily harder to generalize.  
16
 See the writings of Friedrich Kratochwil.  
17
 The development of an American identity was not only something which was made room for – it 
was a strongly sought after part of the constitutive process of the then fragile young republic.  
18
 More my interpretation than anything else. Constructivism, as such, is weak in its predictive (and 
prescriptive) qualities.  
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noted, though, that it is not necessarily something etched in stone. There could be, and 
most often will be, other factors contributing to such stability.  
   
 
2.4 Complex interdependence  
International relations theorists Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye jr. are not only 
famed academics in the field of political science. They have also pioneered the 
specific conceptual framework which will form the second and additional theoretical 
basis of this thesis.  
The idea of complex interdependence
19
 was brought forth in the influential Power and 
Interdependence (1977) and generally refers to the reciprocal structure of 
international politics.    
Keohane and Nye contend to have witnessed an increased propensity of complex 
transnational relations
20
, dubbed interdependencies
21
, and consequently conclude that 
the world is changing. Or rather; that the traditional and modernist perspectives 
provided in classical international theory are insufficient and ill-equipped in 
explaining the rise of such relations and the politics they produce - and thus the world 
must be changing. Their goal is to offer a new and more adaptive perspective which 
allows for diversity to play a larger role – a pluralist or rationalist alternative, if you 
will. Although Keohane and Nye`s vantage point quite obviously are the realist 
assumptions so heeded in the bipolar postwar period, one ought not pit the notion of 
complex interdependence against realism or see it as a contender. Some certainly 
do
22
, but I would rather see it as a valuable supplement or contrasting viewpoint 
which has its place in filling in the gaps when realism seems unable to fully suit 
empirical realities. 
Although downplaying the importance of (classic) power, complex interdependence 
does not refute it at all. Therefore, the theory may be firmly placed within the scope 
                                                 
19
 Just like conceiving of the concept of complex interdependence in many ways was a reaction to 
neorealism, Keohane and Nye`s conceptual framework is itself often pitted as being a core strand of 
neoliberalism. I am purposely avoiding this discussion and have chosen to deal with complex 
interdependence more as it stands. 
20
 If the number of relations amounts to enough to call it change is a matter of perception. One could 
certainly argue for and against. What strengthens Keohane and Nye`s argument is that the trend must 
be said to have continued (if not drastically picked up in pace) since 1977. 
21
 Relations of mutual dependence. The notion of reciprocity (though not necessarily symmetric) in 
effects is important and serves to distinguish interdependence from interconnectedness. 
22
 Including the authors themselves (Keohane & Nye 1977:20) 
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of classical Morgenthauian realism inasmuch as it assumes a power-maximizing state. 
However, it diverges on several key aspects.  
 
2.4.1 The specific characteristics  
These differences are the ones on to which Keohane and Nye structure the 
characteristics of complex interdependence. Taken together the conditions of the 
theory appear and it becomes clear that it has got very different analytical 
ramifications than that of realism
23
.  
 
2.4.2 Multiple channels 
Firstly, it refutes the realist assumption of the states as coherent units necessarily 
being the dominant actors in the world. Instead it sees a myriad of formal and 
informal channels cutting across the strict interstate channels envisioned by realists, 
potentially involving a host of different actors like non-governmental organizations, 
social movements, multinational corporations and international regimes. By widening 
the scope of connectivity, Keohane and Nye creates a better framework for explaining 
why for instance agencies and departments at times reach out to foreign colleagues 
and operate with a different agenda than that of the incumbent government (thereby 
relaxing the assumption that states will act coherently), or why a non-state actor could 
intervene twice in four years on Balkan territory at the middle and end of the 1990`s 
(thus relaxing the assumption that states are the only units in world politics). These 
tendencies, transgovernmental and transnational respectively, are key facets of this 
first characteristic of complex interdependency.   
 
2.4.3 Minor role of military force 
Secondly, complex interdependence refutes the realist assumption of the use of 
[military] force as an effective instrument of policy. As Keohane and Nye puts it, the 
“perceived margin of safety has widened” (1977:23). States are in other words less 
fearful of being attacked and this changes the ease with which leaders reach for brute 
force as a policy tool.  
                                                 
23
 Justifying the explicit claim Keohane and Nye make in the afterword to the third edition; “the 
concept of complex interdependence is clearly liberal rather than realist” (Keohane & Nye 2001:275) 
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Inasmuch as the primary goal of states is survival, military force will obviously 
remain important and the policy tool will never be taken off the table completely, not 
even among western democracies. However, since most issues facing world leaders 
today are quite different and more complex than before, the age-old policy tool of 
advancing at the enemy is simply not as relevant anymore. For how does one handle 
issues like economic disparity or climate change by the use or threat of brute force? 
The answer is of course that one cannot – at least not very successfully. These issues 
know so few (or no) borders, involve so many policy fields and give rise to such a 
magnitude of plausible remedies. Against such a complex backdrop the cost and level 
of uncertainty of military action rises and it consequently becomes a less appropriate 
instrument.  
 
2.4.4 Absence of hierarchy among issues 
Thirdly, the theory refutes the realist assumption of there being a clear-cut hierarchy 
of issues in world politics. Under conditions of complex interdependence, military 
security is no longer an all-engulfing concern and although still important in some 
issues it will be largely irrelevant in others – like for instance the aforementioned 
ones. What this means in practice is that the scope of the state agenda is wider than 
ever. In some situations energy might be the chief issue. In others the environment, 
unemployment or disease control might be. The list could be made significantly 
longer. The multitude of state policy goals and the way in which they are subject to a 
steady stream of trade-offs have the potential to make the government more receptive 
to influence from pressure groups and domestic issues – a proposed `good`. At the 
same time this means the line between domestic and foreign policy becomes blurred, 
which in turn tends to make for incoherent and unpredictable foreign policy – a 
proposed `evil`.  
 
2.4.5 Asymmetry and the notion of power 
Depending on how one portrays it, complex interdependency has within itself the 
potential to sound overly liberalist and harmonic. It is important to bring forth 
nuances to this erroneous view.  
Hard power and military force are not altogether redundant and, more importantly; 
there is still asymmetry in the dispersion of power and in the political exchanges 
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between states. Here Keohane and Nye pay tribute to thinkers like Rousseau who 
certainly would have agreed to the fact that interdependency not only increases wealth 
but also fosters vulnerability and insecurity (Knutsen 1997:246) 
They employ the terms sensitivity and vulnerability to explain the mechanisms of the 
asymmetry, with the latter being the most important concept. Let me briefly account 
for how they are to be interpreted.  
As stated above, and much like in any relation, the interaction on the international 
stage bears with it the potential for unevenness. Thus, under conditions of complex 
interdependency interactions in most issue areas will impose costs for some and offer 
benefits to others. If one were to substitute `costs` with `vulnerabilities`, one would be 
able to view relative vulnerability as a product of these uneven interdependencies. 
Keohane and Nye see vulnerability
24
 as leading to bargaining weakness and the lack 
of vulnerability as leading to autonomy. Consequently, one could envision the 
interdependent relationship between state A and state B. The less vulnerable of the 
two will gain autonomy and influence from the interaction due to it not being as 
sensitive
25
 to changes in the relationship as the other one is (Keohane & Nye 1977:10-
15).  
As employed by the authors, the notions of sensitivity and vulnerability are more than 
just theoretical intellectualization; they are an exemplification of the strategic thinking 
an actor does in ascertaining the costs of action; or rather, ascertaining the power ratio 
and how its relative position dictates the strategy in bargaining for maximum gain. 
The asymmetries on a particular issue will in other words be a good predicator for 
state policy behavior.  
 
Given that these asymmetries and power differences exist, Keohane and Nye detail 
the processes whereby influence can be applied. 
Linkage is a strategy whereby a state attempts to tie specific issues together in 
hedging against its relative vulnerability. Based on the aforementioned premises of a 
multiplicity of issues and the rather ill-suited nature of military force, it consequently 
means that linking is more a strategy of the weak than that of the strong. The way in 
which this occurs in practice is through international organization. Thus, the 
                                                 
24
 Vulnerability can be said to refer to a situation where the country in question is not able to cope in 
the short run, but has to carry costs even after having attempted to alter policy. 
25
 Sensitivity, on the other hand, refers to a situation in which the country in question is influenced by 
externalities but manages to cope, and carries the costs inferred without altering policies to adapt.  
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international organizations and regimes are to an increased extent the real playing 
fields of international politics. They provide a framework in which the linking 
strategies, issue-by-issue cooperation and broader coalition building can occur, 
usually favoring the small over the big
26
. 
As the regimes and organization become the main venues for bargaining, agenda 
control also becomes a crucial skill. That is; the ability to formulate, set and nourish 
the agenda.  
It is based on these processes that Keohane and Nye can express the structuring and 
somewhat predicative nature of power in organizational politics
27
. 
 
Bargaining is the concrete process by which states seek to further their interests and 
maximize their gains. And when I am saying bargaining here, I am referring to 
bargaining within the structure of regimes and organizations. Keohane has later 
reiterated on this point; 
“One can think of these bargains as reflecting the equilibria of games, which create 
institutions, which then, in turn, establish or solidify equilibria so that these 
institutions, and particular policies, persist” (Keohane in Viotti & Kauppi 2010:167) 
   
When evaluating how autonomy or power relates to interdependence, much pertains 
to the notion of cost. That is; what are the relative costs for an actor in a political 
bargain?  
Which would be less costly for the US; to stand outside the UNCLOS or to partake in 
it fully? If one were to employ a traditional notion of power, the US is clearly able to 
stand outside of the UNCLOS. However, with the gradual increase in the saliency of 
soft power
28
, the US is (or at least should be) evaluating it differently, deeming itself 
more vulnerable than before.  
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 For instance; as witnessed during the discussion for a new economic world order (NIEO) in the 70`s 
where the smaller developing states “ganged up” and attempted to link oil prices to other issues where 
they historically hadn`t had much leverage. This frustrated the powerful states, the United States in 
particular.  
27
 In doing so they are honing in on what regime theorist Stephen D. Krasner would specify more 
thoroughly a few years later; that regimes/organizations play a channeling, if not determining, role in 
the way states behave.    
28
 Another concept coined by Joseph S. Nye jr.  
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Complex interdependence theory assumes and presupposes that interdependence is a 
recognized fact. If that is the case then the theory holds that the cost of a policy is 
better understood in advance. Given that the actors act rationally, they will compare 
different policy options and their costs, and act accordingly.  
 
Keohane and Nye are detailing an international political scene on which the use of 
force is a more and more costly course of action. A military strategy is often `an act of 
desperation` (p. 16). Naturally, one could very well say that the situation is vastly 
different for a superpower like the US compared to that of, say, Switzerland. But 
although the costs of military action for the former are low in militaristic and physical 
terms, they are much higher in other terms
29
 and thus it tends to balance out.  
Quite contrary to common logic, Keohane and Nye contend that it was in fact the 
propensity by which the vulnerable/small states chose military action in for instance 
fishery or jurisdictional disputes that represented the trend since World War II 
(1977:87-91). 
 
It is quite obvious, as Keohane and Nye makes abundantly clear, that the conditions 
set forth by complex interdependence, although spreading, cannot be said to be 
universal per se, but only really pertains to the “advanced information-era 
democracies bordering the Atlantic and the Pacific”(Keohane & Nye in Held & 
McGrew 2003:81-82) – commonly known as the West. That is however sufficient 
enough in this respect. Strictly speaking, complex interdependence is set forth as an 
ideal type, much like realism itself, or liberalism or any other isms for that matter. 
This means that Keohane and Nye do not pose that complex interdependence reflects 
political reality in a perfect fashion. Instead, one must match the empirical situation at 
hand with the ideal type and its assumptions, and see how much explanatory power 
the latter bears with it in portraying reality.  
 
Applying complex interdependence theory to the subject matter of this thesis means 
generally accepting that (1) the world is transforming and global politics has entered a 
new era, and that (2) the implication of this transition is a new understanding of the 
sources of power/leverage.  
                                                 
29
 (soft power, reputation, Iraq..) 
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Much of what is dealt with in the following implicitly relates to power relationships. 
Employing complex interdependence theory helps understand these. After all, if 
(hard) power relationships were such an all-engulfing factor, why would, say, legal 
argumentation and international leeway ever matter at all? I claim they matter, and 
even quite a lot.  
 
 
 
3. Background chapter 
 
3.1 From mystery to mastery and beyond 
A brief historical account of the regulation of the seas  
 
hat would the world be without the ocean
30
? It is an unconceivable 
question really. The ocean is paramount to everything and everybody 
and covers in total some 72 percent
31
 of the globe. No wonder then that 
man has been drawn to it since ancient times. Whether it would be out of necessity or 
choice he has found ever new ways to utilize its vast body of resources. The term 
resources would remain an idle bystander for quite some time still, but would take on 
additional and more pressing meaning around the dawn of the 20
th
 century and spur 
on a push for regulating the activities of the seas. This does not however mean that the 
sea up until this point equated to a mere (wet) Hobbesian world of absolutely no rule 
of law
32
. As the geographical mystery of the seas died down through extensive 
exploring and mapping, and trade took on a more global trait, the finite scope of it all 
dawned on the powers at be and slowly but surely custom, consensus and tradition 
began to make way. To call it law would perhaps be to stretch the concept a bit, but 
                                                 
30
 The concept will alternately be used in the singular and plural form, as is common with both nouns 
sea and ocean.  
31
  (MarineBio 2010)  
32
 There existed a multitude of bilateral and regional arrangements at various times.  
W 
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the freedom of the seas
33
 doctrine nonetheless became a guiding principle the major 
European imperial powers in the 17
th
 century could agree upon
34
. The doctrine did 
essentially two things. Firstly, it secured all coastal nations full and complete 
jurisdiction over about three nautical miles
35
 of their adjacent shorelines. Thus, 
territorial waters had become a household concept. Secondly, it established total 
freedom for all outside of this territorial perimeter – a veritable res nullius. This 
meant that with the exception of the vessels themselves, no state could lay (any kind 
of) claim to the seas and the notion of international waters had been born.  
Although not codified and not always fully respected, this doctrine remained the only 
organizational framework pertaining to the seas for several centuries
36
.   
 
What became clear as time passed though was the fact that the seas could very well 
follow a similar pathway as had been evident on land – that is to say, that without 
more thorough regulation the seas had the very same potential for becoming an arena 
for instability and conflict and disparity
37
. Excessive fishing that threatened fish 
stocks, the frenzied search for oil and gas on the seabed as technology became 
available, the sneaking threat from pollutants of various kinds and not to mention the 
power postures taken up by states with regards to a wide array of things like 
navigational rights, territorial sea limits, economic prerogatives etc and the disputes 
that followed in the wake. This is a non-exhaustive list. The point is merely that new 
technology, power rivalry and the quest for resources came together in the early and 
mid 20
th
 century and created an increasingly pressing need for a more thorough legal 
regime. Thus, a lengthy process to somehow conceive of a convention which would 
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 A concept dating back to Antiquity, although 17
th
 century Dutch lawyer Hugo Grotius is usually 
credited with conceiving of it in his Mare Liberum from 1609 (Potter 1924/2002:8, 27) . 
See The Freedom of the Seas: The Right Which Belongs to the Dutch to Take Part in the East Indian 
Trade (2005) by James Brown Scott or  http://socserv.mcmaster.ca/econ/ugcm/3ll3/grotius/Seas.pdf for 
more on Grotius` writings.  
34
 There were of course numerous incidents of provocations and blatant disregard of the doctrine all the 
way up to the 20
th
 century. This can usually be closely linked with the perpetrating part`s power status 
relative to others and would more than once lead to military conflict. As the perpetrators tended to 
change hats quite a bit, the weaker states usually upheld faith in the doctrine and thus the doctrine 
remained common practice for centuries. 
35 Renowned Dutch legal theorist Cornelius van Bynkershoek`s “cannon shot rule” was the common 
standard. The width of the territorial waters that could be claimed was to be the distance a cannon 
could fire from the water`s edge (Johnston 1998:79-80). By today`s measures that means about three 
nautical miles (=5556 meters).     
36
 Making it perhaps the oldest customary international law there is.  
37
 Initially freedom of the seas referred to freedom of navigation only. In time, tough, the concept took 
on more freedoms – like some of the ones mentioned in Article 87 of the UNCLOS; freedom of 
fishing, overflight, scientific research etc (Rothwell and Bateman 2000:4)   
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be acceptable to all started – a process which began in between World Wars I & II 
and would eventually culminate in a very substantial piece of legislation in 1982, the 
UNCLOS.  
 
Besides from viewing the evolution toward the UNCLOS based on the substantive 
and concrete precursors mentioned above, I think it would be useful to bear in mind at 
least two of the larger contextual historical factors and their potential influence.  
 
First, one would of course have to tie it in with the lessons learned by recently having 
gone through two horrific world wars and the subsequent desire to weave nations 
closer together in some kind of institutional arrangement. The second, and this time 
around more successful, attempt at creating a Kantian community of nations (the 
United Nations) is perhaps the best tangible outcome of said desire. The hope was to 
significantly weaken or at least dilute the importance of (hard) power in international 
relations. Some, like David M. Kennedy (1987) in The Move to Institutions, seem to 
argue that this institutionalization in essence created a third and elevated pillar by 
which international affairs could be handled – comparable to politics and law, and in 
many cases preferable. His main point is that the aforementioned desire has been an 
integral part of what Kennedy views as a tripartite process toward an ever more 
complete international institutional apparatus – one which ends (thus far) with the 
UNCLOS. With the League of Nations came parliament, with the United Nations 
(UN) came administration and with the UNCLOS came adjudication. Mythic rhythm 
he dubs it (Ibid:986).  
I would call it institutional momentum and deem it a necessary though not sufficient 
condition in facilitating for the UNCLOS.    
 
Second is a factor which at first glance may be difficult to ascertain the importance of. 
I am referring to the Cold War. At the substantive level there are obvious enough 
reasons to include it. A wide array of new events, factors and technologies came 
together and, when viewed against the backdrop of the increasing competition and 
tension between East and West, seemed to demand a better regulatory regime at sea. 
The A- and H-bombs and their sea-based delivery systems; the creation of NATO and 
the escalating cat-and-mouse games on the oceans; the thirst for carbon-rich 
petroleum and the subsequent prospective seabed mining; geographical claims on 
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both sides of the spectrum that served to encroach upon the existing jurisdictional 
limits. Factors like these, and others, would certainly have played well to those who 
were already proposing a universal and more stable order.      
Having put down the premise that regulation of the seas was primarily a Western 
initiative, it might seem a puzzle why the other side would generally favor and 
participate in it – given the above-mentioned tensions. I think this is to underestimate 
the complexity of the Cold War and the interests which were at stake.  
General political theory speaks of the particularities of bipolarity and of the many 
possible outcomes binding measures such as the creation and adoption of the 
UNCLOS are certainly plausible facets. Notwithstanding all the other arguments, 
adherence to it could very well be rational for both parties (in a bipolar situation) if it 
serves to create greater predictability
38
. Thus, concurring interests in such matters can 
in itself be an expression of security politics
39
.  
Leaving that be, I think one last point is important to put forth.  
If one were to take a Western perspective, it seems reasonable that the presence of a 
clear and strong adversary would tend to lead to more
40
 multilateralism – even for the 
United States
41
.  
In the excellent Special Providence
42
 Walter Russell Mead (2002:290) touches on this 
point. He writes;  
“The decade following the Cold War provided growing evidence that the old 
American reluctance to pool sovereignty with other countries for a common purpose 
was still strong and, with the Soviet menace out of the way, playing an increasing role 
in the politics of American foreign policy”. 
This quote illuminates two points nicely. On the one hand it validates the Cold War as 
a factor in the seemingly Wilsonian-styled multilateralism mentioned earlier and on 
the other hand it points to the inherently bipolar (sic) or two-headed approach of the 
US. 
Picking up on Mead`s lead, let me thus delve from the general into the specific and 
have a look at the US in particular and its historical relationship with laws at sea.   
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 A clear analogy to the (mutual) so-called confidence-building measures (CBM`s).  
39
 Although security usually equated to the hard militaristic version during the Cold War.   
40
 Temporary or permanently.  
41
 This can reversely also, at least in theory, apply to the Eastern bloc.   
42
 Full title: Special Providence. American Foreign Policy and How it Changed the World.  
  
29 
3.2 The American historic relationship with laws at sea 
 
Ever since its conception only some 234 years ago, the US has by necessity been very 
preoccupied with every-and-all things maritime. At first, this related in particular to 
two things; defending its new-won sovereignty and preserving commercial ties to 
foreign markets. Historian C. Vann Woodward once wrote that the great benefit [of 
the United States] came from nature`s gift of three vast bodies of water – [the 
Atlantic, the Pacific and the Arctic] – interposed between this country and any other 
power that might constitute a serious menace to its safety (in Gaddis 2004:7). His 
statement
43
 serves to illustrate the situation in the early days. On the one hand, the 
vast bodies of water sheltered the US to a certain degree and represented an advantage 
in matters of security, while at the same time these waters could not be left to others 
to police because of the crucial need to secure US access to overseas markets                        
44
. Consequently, the US had an evident strategic interest in seeing to it that no one 
(other) power could dominate the seas and threaten both the existence and (at least) 
the inherent potential of the United States. It would come as no surprise, then, that the 
Americans quickly became eager advocates for the freedom of the seas doctrine.  
Since those early days much has changed. This is not the least of which true in 
regards to the US itself. It is bigger, more set in its ways and much more powerful. 
Still, the oceans remain a matter of great concern for it and the defense of the freedom 
of the seas doctrine
45
 is something that permeates much of its policies.  
 
As mentioned earlier; after World War II (a war in which the US came out of 
stronger, relatively speaking), the US took the lead in attempting to create a more 
comprehensive legal regime at sea. The freedom of the seas doctrine had certainly not 
been sufficient to deter belligerent nations in the tumultuous first part of the 20
th
 
century. The US, as most other states, observed this and so it more or less 
permanently departed from its isolationist heritage and took the lead in first 
facilitating for the creation of the UN and later for the ocean-specific treaties that 
were to follow. 
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 Although originally meant to illustrate the relationship between the concept of security and the 
American character – an alternately inward- and outward looking one.  
44
 One needs to remember that although we are in 2010 now, some 75 percent of global trade is still 
carried by sea (Port of Rotterdam 2009) 
45
 Or rather freedom of navigation, which is the correct current terminology.  
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However, although leaping into multilateralism on the one hand, the US at the same 
time took unilateral steps coming out of World War II – steps which at least partly 
can be blamed for the subsequent cascade of claims and expansionist moves the world 
witnessed with regard to the seas. The most important ones were two proclamations 
President Truman issued in 1945 in which he asserted (1) US jurisdiction over the 
continental shelf and its resources, and (2) the ability to protect fisheries by 
establishing conservation zones in these waters (Food and Agriculture Organization 
of the United Nations 1987)
46
.  Although neither of the proclamations suppressed the 
freedom of navigation concept
47
 and even though the Americans initially did not 
follow up on the second point with regard to their own coastal waters, the tone and 
spirit of it all was not lost on other states which began moving to the American beat 
and unilaterally extended their asserted claims significantly.  
The Truman proclamations thus served two slightly conflicting interests.  
On the one hand they threatened the freedom of the seas doctrine, so cherished by the 
US, and on the other they helped, however unintentional, to usher in the very 
framework that would overtake its role.  
 
By the mid-1950s the stage was set to once more convene the nations of the world for 
a serious attempt at what had failed in the interbellum period, namely crafting a 
codified set of maritime rules. The proclamations Truman issued and the movement 
of creeping jurisdiction
48
 it ushered in had certainly served to give it a sense of 
urgency.  
The 86-state strong first Conference of the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS I) held at 
Geneva in 1956 was considered a moderate success in that it created four 
conventions
49
 which codified generally accepted freedoms at sea – all of which the 
US signed and acceded to
50
. However, it left out highly contentious matters of 
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 These proclamations were later backed up by legislation, such as the 1953 Submerged Lands Act and 
particularly the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (Galdorisi & Vienna 1997:21)   
47
 Still of vital importance to the US.  
48
 (Galdorisi & Vienna 1997:22). Also see page 55 for a discussion of the associated creeping 
uniqueness.  
49
 Convention on (1) the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, (2) the Continental Shelf, (3) the 
High Seas and (4) Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas. In addition, an 
optional protocol of dispute settlement was included.  
50
 The optional protocol of dispute settlement was however rejected.  
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territorial sea delimitation
51
 and fisheries issues. These were supposed to be addressed 
during UNCLOS II in 1960. Although coming incredibly close
52
, the Conference 
failed to produce any agreement and was thus ultimately unsuccessful.  
The US upheld a consistent practice through the 50s, 60s and 70s of refusing to accept 
the legality of territorial sea claims which exceeded the old three mile limit. Although 
most, if not all, states had far exceeded this claim themselves and/or recognized 
others` by this point (thus constituting something close to customary law), the 
American position rested on a simple, strategic premise; that as long as the limits of 
territorial seas remained uncodified it would best serve US interests (as a superpower) 
to keep on refusing these claims consistently because that would enable it to oppose 
the claims without be seen as not abiding by the rule of law. It would, in other words, 
enable the US to create for itself an exemption to the customary rule – making the US 
claiming the status of a persistent objector
53
. The American objections were largely 
ignored and by not putting force behind it the US failed to prevent international 
acceptance of the 12-mile limit
54
 (Roach & Smith 1996:19).  
 
When the 1980`s came around, the political climate in Washington had changed in 
favor of the Republican party. It was thus Ronald Reagan who sat at the helm when 
the nine year long negotiation process concluded in late 1982 with presenting a 
comprehensive agreement, UNCLOS III, for the nations to consider.  Although 
shrouded in anti-communist and partisan rhetoric at the time, the power of hindsight 
speaks of a Reagan administration which might very well have signed the agreement 
had it not been for the objections it had towards Part XI – the deep seabed and mining 
provisions of the treaty. Due to those, Reagan refused to sign, but (in his Statement on 
Oceans Policy) instructed his government to accept and comply with the rest of the 
treaty.  
 
This has at least been the consensus up until quite recently. Recent comments by 
some of Reagan`s closest aides and a book of memoirs from the President himself has 
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 Thus failing to deal with perhaps the most critical issue. This was indeed the same hurdle the Haag 
initiative in the 1930s could not overcome.  
52
 A compromise proposition of a six-mile territorial sea plus six-mile fisheries zone came within but 
one vote of being adopted (Churchill & Lowe 1983:14) 
53
A status similar to that which Norway has secured in respect to the ban on commercial whaling the 
International Whaling Convention instigated in the mid 80s.  
54
 A limit the US itself eventually claimed from 1988 onwards.  
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stirred up a ruckus lately and, more importantly, has cast doubts over what Reagan`s 
objections really amounted to. I will touch upon this point in more detail later.  
 
For now it suffices to say that work to somehow amend the disputed provisions began 
ever so slowly right away, but the real change didn`t come until George H.W. Bush`s 
presidency. He sent negotiators to the UN table, and between 1990 and 1994 they 
worked to reach an agreement the US (and other non-signatories) could live with. The 
end result was what is commonly known as the 1994 Agreement
55
. It amended the 
flaws Reagan had (officially) pointed to, and thus, then-president Clinton quickly 
signed and moved to submit the UNCLOS (with the `94 Agreement) to the Senate for 
its advice and consent for accession and ratification.  From this point on the US has 
considered the UNCLOS as a codification of customary international law. A month 
after Clinton signed the treaty it reached the threshold of 60 ratifications and officially 
went into force. At the same time however, the US `94 midterm elections saw the 
Republican Party take back control of the Senate and the new chair of the Foreign 
Relations Committee (SFRC), Senator Jesse Helms, refused to hold the necessary 
hearings on the matter. Following Mr. Helm`s retirement in January 2001, the treaty 
has passed through the Committee level with ease
56
, but continues to linger on in the 
full Senate due to fierce opposition from an adamant, albeit small, group of 
Republican senators.    
 
4. Analysis  
 
4.1 The UNCLOS  
 
lthough consisting of some 320 articles and nine annexes, the UNCLOS is 
still essentially a framework agreement. That means that there will be 
issues on the outskirts of it that may need tweaking to, negotiation of or 
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 Full title; “the Agreement relating to the implementation of Part XI of the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982”.  
56
 Two public hearings were held in late 2003, and on February 25th 2004 the SFRC by a unanimous 
vote (19-0) recommended that the Senate give its advice and consent for accession to the UNCLOS and 
ratification of the 94 Agreement. On October 31 2007 the SFRC again voted (17-4) to recommend that 
the Senate give its advice and consent.  
A 
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tinkering with. On the other hand, since it is a framework agreement a tool kit is 
already in place to deal with many of the challenges that lie ahead. It assumes and 
anticipates that there will be offshore drilling, that nations will want to extent their 
grasp on the continental shelf, that pollution and climate change will become a big 
problem etc. And as such, the framework is already there, complete with dispute 
settlement procedures and everything. 
 
The UNCLOS is far too elaborate a document to account for in detail here. However, 
some of its more important features are as follows; 
- It determines a 12 nautical mile limit to the territorial sea and secures other 
states the right of innocent passage through it.  
- It secures the right of transit passage through straits used for international 
navigation. 
- It codifies 200-nautical mile economic exclusive zones (EEZs) wherein the 
coastal states enjoy sovereignty regarding natural resources and certain 
economic activities, plus exercising jurisdiction over environmental protection 
and marine science research activities.  
- It secures the coastal states sovereign rights to their continental shelf sea beds 
for exploitation within the EEZs, and even further if they can submit 
convincing geological evidence to the effect to the newly established body 
Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS). 
- It sets up the International Seabed Authority (ISA) to manage the future 
exploration and exploitation of the deep sea bed which lies beyond the 
additional claims made to the CLCS.   
- It codifies the traditional freedoms on the high seas, but appeals to the states to 
cooperate in managing the resources in a sustainable way.  
- It provides for detailed specifications on delimitation and classification of 
waters, and sets up the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) 
to rule in disputes (if the parties do not instead choose the ICJ or arbitration as 
dispute settlement mechanisms).  
 
  
34 
Just like with John Selden and Hugo Grotius in the 17
th
 century
57
, the architects of the 
UNCLOS had to deal with the fundamental debate of whether to favor coastal state 
jurisdiction over adjacent waters or to protect free navigational rights by nearly all 
means necessary. The aim was of course to somehow incorporate both elements. That 
is why the Convention attempts to protect both dominion and freedom.  
 
The creators of the UNCLOS have been wise in many a way. This is certainly true 
when it comes to the way in which they have tied delimitation and dispute settlement 
to rather static entities. Dispute settlement in international treaties is usually contained 
within separate protocols. In the UNCLOS, however, it was incorporated in, and 
made a part of the treaty itself, thus making it compulsory for those party to the 
Convention to utilize its dispute settlement mechanism if/when disputes with other 
parties materialize. 
 
Second is the negotiating principle that was adopted; consensus – as opposed to 
voting. This is why negotiations took as long as nine years to conclude. Tendencies of 
bloc voting had been evident for quite some time within the UN system, and to avoid 
that the NIEO-wind
58
 would paralyze the negotiations, the consensus principle was 
chosen.   
Another way in which they have been wise has been to make the UNCLOS a package 
deal – meaning that it has been presented to the parties as a “yay or nay”, leaving no 
room for individual amendments or reservations on specific articles of the treaty. In 
this way they have attempted to overcome or alleviate a very typical procedural 
obstacle which often will change a treaty into becoming more of a lowest common 
denominator
59
.   
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 See Potter (1924/2002:57-78) for more.  
58
 By the turn of the 1970s fiscal and monetary problems had begun to loom large and the US (Nixon) 
decided to take the dollar off of the gold standard, effectively ending the Bretton Woods system. Soon 
thereafter, the exchange rate regime collapsed due to floatatious currencies. At approx. the same time a 
war broke out in the unstable Middle East, with the oil-rich Arab nations reacting to US support of 
Israel by employing their crucial market position in cutting oil shipments to the US and various western 
nations for six months - creating huge problems within the oil-dependent liberal western sphere. 
This is in many ways the backdrop to the position taken up by the developing world in their call for 
NIEO (Lake 2009:222-223). They witnessed the success in which the Arabs managed to exploit an 
asset and turn it into very real, coercive power and set about trying to levy their own power to promote 
their interests. It was, in other words, essentially about growing disparities in wealth between the 
developed and developing worlds.  
59
 Speth and Haas 2006:102-103.  
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The well-informed would of course point to the `94 Agreement as being precisely 
what was sought to avoid; an important country succeeding in changing the 
agreement to fit its interests. That is an accurate observation. Still, in comparison with 
the total scope of the treaty the `94 Agreement amended fairly small parts of it. In 
addition, one would obviously have to weight it and choose between the two “evils”; 
the full original treaty lacking the signature of the world`s most important state, or a 
slightly watered down version that enables all to climb onboard.          
 
One could indeed question the semantics and wish for even more detailed provisions. 
Part VI, which deals with the continental shelf, is a good example. There is bound to 
be at least some ambiguity tied to certain terms in Article 76, like for instance “foot of 
the continental slope”60 or “natural prolongation of its land territory”61.  
In the case of the latter, however, it seems as though the concept of natural 
prolongation has been phased out in case law
62
 and replaced with geologically more 
precise measures. The former could still render some definitional confusion within the 
scientific milieu, but rulings from the CLCS expected later this year and in 2011 will 
surely set precedent on this rather technical matter and as such, perform its intended 
function.  
International treaties and the regulatory regimes they bear with them are often heavily 
reliant on precedent - a concept which is not altogether free of problems – not the 
least of which is its (additional) susceptibility to interpretation. There are however 
few alternatives. International law and its arbitration systems are and will remain very 
much bound by custom, precedent and case law
63
. 
 
 
The Northwest Passage dispute revisited 
 
The Northwest Passage is much like a labyrinth - it is a complex topic and can be 
entered at many points. This begets a need for limitation. The reading of the legal 
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 Article 76, 4a (i and ii) 
61
 Article 76, 1 
62
 Although China and certain others seem to have missed that point in their submitted claims to CLCS.  
63
 In a comparative perspective, this is especially true with regard to the ITLOS (Miller 2002:498).   
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ramifications of the UNCLOS, for instance, can be drawn out in great length and will 
consequently be dealt with in a selective and limited fashion. 
 
Although disagreement over the status of the Northwest Passage has long prevailed, 
there are two seminal historical events I wish to emphasize. They have in their own 
ways both contributed greatly to the framework in which the dispute is currently 
being construed by the two countries party to it.  
They are but exerts, but I choose to focus on them a bit because it is precisely the stirs 
of sentiment (particularly on the Canadian side) which was created by these two 
occurrences back then which is now being rekindled in the face of the effects of 
global warming.  
 
The Manhattan voyage 
On March 12
th
 1968 a huge petroleum field was discovered at Prudhoe Bay on the 
North Slope of Alaska -  a field which would become the biggest in North America
64
. 
Although it was still not economically viable at the time, authorities and oil 
companies began dabbling with how to transport the oil and gas to US markets when 
the threshold would be overcome and exploitation could commence
65
. Of the many 
suggestions at hand, transporting the bounty to eastern refineries by supertankers 
through the Northwest Passage was one of only a handful of possible solutions that 
were deemed feasible enough to investigate further. Hence, this was the official and 
external backdrop to why a group of oil companies
66
, with the blessing of the federal 
government, invested some $50+ million into refitting the 150 000 ton 306 meter 
supertanker SS Manhattan for ice-breaking capabilities and in late August 1969 sent it 
through the Passage on a trip that took it from Chester, Pennsylvania to Point Barrow 
at the northernmost tip of Alaska. There it loaded a ceremonial barrel of oil and 
ventured back. The three month
67
 voyage was not without its perilous moments 
though. In the McClure Strait the ice proved thick enough to significantly slow down 
the Manhattan, even to the point where it needed help from the two Coast Guard 
                                                 
64
 Which it remains to this very day.  
65
 The turning-point was the Arab oil embargo in the early 1970`s, which sent gasoline prices sky-high 
and gave President Nixon the incentive he needed to push for rapid commencement of exploitation.  
66
 Spearheaded by what is now Exxon (then Humble Oil).  
67
 The 9000 mile trip was expected to take only two months.  
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icebreakers which accompanied it
68
. The decision was thus made to alter the route, 
and the ship turned back and successfully navigated through the Prince of Wales 
Strait instead. In addition, the ice had also damaged the hull to the extent that it took 
several months to repair it when the ship came back to New York in November.   
 
The Manhattan voyage had three important consequences – one immediate and 
Alaskan oil-related only, and the other two more long-term and contextually 
important. Firstly, the trials and tribulations of the trip and the damage incurred on the 
ship made the oil companies disregard shipping through the Passage as an 
economically feasible and (particularly) safe option (for their needs at that time)
69
. 
Secondly, and more importantly, it proved that traversing the Passage by merchant 
ice-breaking ships was in fact technically doable. This lesson had a resounding effect 
on the political scenes on both sides of the border, though especially in Canada, 
because it was actual, physical evidence of the inherent potential of the Passage – 
whether perceived as a good or a bad. Third, and closely linked with the second 
lesson, the voyage caused great environmental concern in Canada, not only among the 
Inuit and the people at large, but also in Ottawa. The fact that the Manhattan came 
back from its first trip
70
 anything but unharmed only served to exacerbate the 
concerns about detrimental oil spills in the pristine North. Hence, as a direct effect of 
the voyage Canadian legislators felt pressure from the populous to enact tougher 
environmental regulations and expediently passed the Canadian Arctic Waters 
Pollution Prevention Act in 1970
71
. The bill gave Canadian authorities a 100 mile
72
 
reach outwards from the coast to regulate safety and environmental concerns through 
ship construction and operations provisions. The US reacted by making it 
unequivocally clear that it would not, and could not, accept Canada making Arctic 
waters their own internal waters
73
.   
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 The Westwind (US) and the John A. McDonald (Can). A scouting helicopter also accompanied it 
from above.  
69
 Instead they went for the option of a land-based pipeline. Consequently, the Trans-Alaskan Pipeline 
System was constructed between 1974 and 1977 to the cost of over $8 billion.  
70
 There were in fact two. The Manhattan repeated its 1969 voyage the following summer.  
71
 Inspired by the Canadian move, the Soviets enacted similar environmental regulations for the 
Northeast Passage in 1971. Unsurprisingly then, the Soviets did not protest to the Act. Neither did the 
two other Arctic states Denmark and Norway.  
72
 Recently extended to 200 nautical miles. 
73
 Which the Canadian step implicitly amounted to.  
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“Such acceptance would jeopardize the freedom of navigation essential for United 
States naval activities worldwide, and would be contrary to our fundamental position 
that the regime of the high seas can be altered only by multilateral agreement. 
Furthermore, our efforts to limit extensions of coastal state sovereignty over the high 
seas worldwide will be damaged when other nations see that a country -- physically, 
politically and economically -- as close to the United States as Canada, feels it can 
undertake such action in the face of United States opposition” – Memorandum from 
the US State Department, March 12
th
 1970. 
(U.S. Department of State 2010) 
Thus, two conflicting legal postures had been assumed.  
 
The Polar Sea voyage 
Although the Manhattan voyage served to create some public debate in Canada as to 
the Passage`s sovereignty status (analog to the environmental concerns), it was little 
compared to the fuzz that followed a voyage some 16 years later by the US icebreaker 
CGS Polar Sea. It set out from Thule in Greenland, ventured through the Northwest 
Passage and sailed into Point Barrow, Alaska in just over two weeks. A fairly 
straight-forward task for a powerful icebreaker when faced with mere August ice – 
and the issue at hand was not really even about the fact that the trip was done. The 
controversial part was that Washington ignored Canada`s sovereignty claims and had 
not asked permission to sail through. In between the Manhattan and Polar Sea 
voyages, some three other ships, one Polish and two Swedish, had made full or partial 
transits of the Passage, but only after having asked and secured permission to do so 
from Ottawa. The fact that the Polar Sea had not stirred a heated public debate and 
caused anxiety in Canada (Griffiths 1987:243). .  
 
The voyage was obviously not as dramatic as it might have been portrayed in 
Canadian media at the time. In fact, the US did notify Ottawa of the impending 
voyage
74
, and three Canadian observers went along for the ride. What mattered, 
however, was the fact that the US had explicitly (and probably consciously
75
) not 
asked permission. Regardless of what the true US rationale for the voyage was and 
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 On May 21
st
 (Molot & Tomlin 1986:191) 
75
 There has been much contradictory evidence, so it is still uncertain to this very day whether the US 
made the transit to assert its claims or merely due to operational requirements.  
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regardless of whether or not the Canadian response was well thought through, the 
Polar Sea voyage was an important milestone in three respects.  
First, it made it unequivocally clear what was the American view on the issue of the 
status of the Passage. The US had long stated that it deemed the Passage to be an 
international strait, but it had now shown it through action. 
Second, it had the effect of sharpening the signals from Ottawa. Previous statements 
vis-à-vis the claim to the Passage as internal waters had been limited, but the Polar 
Sea incident led the Mulroney government to introduce a straight geographic baseline 
system
76
  in accordance with Article 7 of the UNCLOS and thus enclose the channels 
of the Arctic Archipelago as fully internal to Canada, effective January 1
st
 1986. 
Nothing had changed with regard to the claim itself, but the Canadians had now 
altered the justification for said claim – an important step with regard to possible 
future adjudication in, say, the International Court of Justice (ICJ).  
Third, it served to bring the parties to the negotiating table and eventually lead to an 
agreement of sorts. Following pressure at home, the Canadian government had 
reacted to the voyage by hurryingly announcing six policy initiatives. It was an ad-
hoc reaction which accompanied the straight baseline system (which was more 
carefully vetted), but they nonetheless came to make up the fundamentals of Canadian 
Arctic Policy for the rest of the decade and well into the new one (Huebert in Micaud 
& Nossal 2001:84). One of these initiatives
77
 (and the only one that really represented 
something new per sè) was the decision to approach the US with hopes of coming to 
an understanding. After quickly realizing that the US stood steadfast on its views on 
both the status of the Passage and the UNCLOS (as the treaty stood at the time), the 
Canadians shifted focus and a deal was eventually struck once President Reagan and 
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 Straight baselines involve drawing straight lines from headland to headland instead of following 
every indentation of the coast when marking maritime delimitation. It was actually Norway who first 
came up with the notion of drawing straight baselines. It did so before World War II in order to protect 
its jagged coastline and penetrating fjords from foreign trespassing, and the practice got international 
recognition when Britain challenged the validity of it before the ICJ and lost in 1951.  
77
 The five other initiatives included (1) deciding to construct a new class of icebreakers to better 
enforce the northern areas, (2) lifting the reservation Canada had attached to the Arctic Waters 
Pollution Prevention Act with regards to letting it be challenged in the International Court of Justice (a 
reservation which had essentially been an admittance of the fact that the Act was illegal until the 
UNCLOS provided for a 200 mile regulatory zone in 1982), (3) increasing aerial and naval activities in 
the High North, (4)  introducing the Canadian Laws Offshore Act which was intended to clarify and 
bolster the reach of the Canadian law, and (5) deciding to introduce a straight baseline system all 
around the Arctic archipelago so as to establish a legal claim to the area under the provisions in the 
UNCLOS (Huebert in Micaud & Nassal 2001:chapter 6). This fifth initiative was protested by both the 
US and the EU.  
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Prime Minister Mulroney got involved personally. The Arctic Cooperation 
Agreement, as it was called, was signed in mid-January 1988 and contained five short 
articles (United Nations 2010b). The message conveyed by these was simple enough; 
that the US and Canada would actively cooperate in Coast Guard icebreaker
78
 
operations in one another`s Arctic waters without prejudice to their respective 
positions on the larger legal matter. The Canadians scored a little win in that the 
Americans pledged to seek consent when traversing the contested waters, while the 
US got a more cooperative
79
 little brother without having to forego its legal claim
80
. It 
was in essence a modus vivendi – an agreement to disagree.  
 
The viability of the Passage 
With the exception of military and expeditionary navigation, there is still virtually no 
commercial shipping going through the Passage. There is some going in and out – to 
mines and oil sights and such – but not much going through81. That means the ice – 
the old and new – is still a significant enough factor to halt the development of the 
economic Shangri-la some envision.  
In addition, new survey data indicate that most of the seven routes of the 
Passage are too shallow at the most shallow points to be able to handle the 
supertankers of today. Consequently, with the possibility of dredging excluded, the 
waters of the Northwest Passage are not necessarily interesting for all segments of the 
shipping market, generally loosing out to the deeper Northeast Passage/Northern Sea 
Route. The latter is also favourable in that the Arctic winds usually blow in such a 
way as to make for safer passage. Plus, there are already fully operational deep-sea 
ports along the route. 
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 Note that the agreement thus far only extends to coast guard icebreakers. The commercial and naval 
vessels of both countries are not included.  
79
 For the US it was also a plus that the agreement lead to the scrapping of the Canadian submarine 
program. The Mulroney government had planned to construct expensive nuclear submarines to flex its 
muscles up north. However, this would mean that the Canadians would forego many of its 
commitments to the defense of Europe (among which was the 1987 announcement that Ottawa would 
not send troops to Norway in times of crisis) which represented a problem for the US. Thus, US 
pressure combined with domestic concern about the costs lead to the abandoning of the plans.  
80
 A narrow strategic evaluation of the relative gains achieved through the agreement would perhaps 
see Canada as having benefited the most in that although the agreement didn`t bolster the Canadian 
claim in and of itself, it did negate the possible impact of American actions that might otherwise have 
hurt the claim.    
81
 During September 2009 the very first commercial ship ventured through the Passage, transporting 
cargo from Montreal to a site in the Nunavut territory (CBC 2008).  
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In fact, the Russians have already begun to allow foreign commercial vessels passage 
through the Northern Sea Route, charging up to $500 000 per transit
82
.                                           
On the other side however, Russia is Russia
83
. And shipping interests might be 
sensitive to this point.  
 
It is important to bear in mind that, given the premise of a linear continuation of the 
ice-melt, the viability of the Northwest Passage is most likely going to be but a 
temporary matter. When the melting closes in on leaving the entire Arctic Ocean ice-
free, vessels will choose the shorter and (then) easier route right across the North 
Pole. That day is however somewhere off into the uncertain future, and bears little 
relevance in how the Americans and Canadians position themselves in the dispute.  
 
 
The legal dispute and the arguments explained 
 
“There is no doubt about Canada`s territorial sovereignty over the islands forming 
the Canadian Arctic Archipelago nor about Canada`s exclusive rights over the 
continental shelf of those islands, but the extent and basis of Canada`s jurisdiction 
over the waters of the archipelago in question is not as certain” (Pharand 1971:1) 
 
Canadian law professor Donat Pharand
84
 sums it up quite neatly. It is not about 
sovereignty per sè – it is about navigational rights85. That means first agreeing on the 
legal status of the waters. After all, the waterways in question obviously must have a 
legal status – and there are but three choices. They constitute either (1) internal 
waters, (2) a territorial sea or (3) an international strait. The legal dispute essentially 
evolves around which of these three are applicable to the channels and straights of the 
Passage.  
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 Should the Northwest Passage open up completely and Canada could make the case that it is internal, 
the Canadians could charge transit fees, perhaps in the range of the Panama and Suez Canals, where 
fees amount to between $2 to 4 billion per year.  
83
 See page 82.  
84
 Mr. Pharand is still publishing articles although he is closing in on 90 years old. He has written in 
the field of UNCLOS and Arctic issues for half a century and is regarded as the Canadian with the 
most expertise in the field.  
85
 The question of if other states are to be granted right of transit and/or right of innocent passage.  
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I do not purport to be a law scholar myself. A comprehensive assessment of the 
validity of the legal claims may thus be beyond the scope of both my abilities and, 
surely, this thesis. However, a tentative probe into the judicial aspects is necessary to 
understand the issues at hand. So be it, then, if it will need to be of a limited and 
surface-dwelling nature.  
 
 
4.2.1 The Canadian legal case 
Canada claims the waters of the Passage as internal and has done so by invoking two 
legal methods of delimitation.   
The precursor to these two was the so-called sector principle
86
 - the oft-announced 
claim made in the years and decades after the transfer of title of the Arctic 
Archipelago from the British to Canada in 1880. It informally promulgated that the 
area between the 60
th
 and 141
st
 meridians of longitude all the way to the Pole (90 
degrees N) was the dominion of Canada. Implicit in this lay the claim to the waters as 
well. That is to say, that not only did Canada own the region per sè, its waters were 
also just as Canadian as the lakes and rivers of Ontario, and could consequently be 
dealt with as Ottawa pleased. Practically no other nations concurred. However, the 
entire issue was never particularly relevant seeing as though the area was packed with 
ice and held little or no strategic interest.   
Following the Manhattan voyage of 1969, a shell-shocked Canada felt obliged to state 
its claims in clearer terms and went about formulating a more coherent argument with 
reference to international law. From this point
87
 onwards, Canada began arguing that 
the Passage constituted [Canadian] “historic internal waters”.  
 
Claim I : “The Passage is Canada`s internal waters by virtue of historic title” 
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 Although the theory itself dates back a few hundred years, it is generally considered that Senator 
Pascal Poirier was the one who first put it into a systematized and Canadian context when he used the 
concept to claim territorial sovereignty in the Arctic in a speech delivered before the Senate in 1907     
(Parker & Madjd-Sadjadi 2009:6). Although not gaining particularly much sympathy from the 
government at the time, the theory got a good enough foothold so as to stay relevant and has on various 
occasions been (unsuccessfully) employed as legal justification. Nowadays it is deemed more or less 
defunct.  
87
 The first official statement to this effect came in 1973 when the Bureau of Legal Affairs released a 
memo making the historic waters claim explicit (Pharand 2007:10).  
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By invoking such a justification Canada is making the case that there is something 
inherent and defined by the course of history which enables it to supersede purely 
geographical considerations to prevent the application of those rules and regulations 
that apply to the territorial sea, the EEZ or the high seas, and uphold the entire area as 
one being within its domestic jurisdiction (Dufresne 2007). In less cloudy language 
this means that Canada would point to specific things like; (1) the fact that British 
explorers had mapped large parts of the Archipelago prior to the 1880 transfer of 
title
88
, (2) that the indigenous population, the Inuits, who are [now] Canadian citizens, 
have lived on and with the areas for hundreds and even thousands of years, and (3) 
that few non-consensual transits have occurred.  
 
Although it is generally recognized in international law, the historic waters concept is 
a poorly grounded one. Both its precise legal definition and the basic requirements for 
its acquisition have been subject to debate. As of today, the consensus that exists 
flows from the 19
th
 century concept of historic bays and the manner in which a 
handful of 20
th
 century court cases
89
 and UN committees
90
 have interpreted its 
application to specific claims and thus created a [slight] body of authoritative 
definitions. In order to claim historic title one must satisfy three basic requirements; 
(1) exclusive exercise of state jurisdiction, (2) a long lapse of time and (3) 
acquiescence by foreign states (Pharand 2007:7).  
These are the three criteria to which the Canadian claim is compared.  
The third one is obviously not satisfied, in so far as the US and the European Union 
(EU) have both made their objections known – and in writing at that. Consequently, 
the historic title claim must fall already at this point. In addition, [Canadian] Donat 
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 The legitimacy of which no one refutes or counters. One could thus argue that that means that in this 
specific argumentative instance there is no timeline being broken at the point of takeover in 1880 and 
Canada can draw historic lines all the way back to the exploits of Henry Hudson, John Cabot and their 
likes.  
89
 Among which was the Fisheries Case of 1951 between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland (UK) and Norway. In addition one could mention other cases which were important to 
support the historic consolidation claim; like the 1975 Spain vs Morocco dispute over Western parts of 
Sahara wherein the presence of nomadic people was accepted as a way of establishing sovereignty, or 
in the much earlier case of the 1933 Norway vs. Denmark dispute over Eastern Greenland where the 
court ruled that the degree of presence needed to claim title over territory is lower in inhospitable 
regions (like the Arctic) than in warmer climates.  
90
 Mainly two UN Secretariat documents prepared for the first Law of the Sea Conference, “1957 
Memorandum on Historic Bays” and “1962 Juridical Regime of Historic Waters, including Historic 
Bays”.  
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Pharand (2007:13) and others have also shown that it is highly doubtful that Canada 
would be able to meet the former two either.  
 
 
Claim II : “The Passage is Canada`s internal waters due to being located within 
straight baselines” 
 
More than being an altogether different claim in and of itself, the straight baseline 
claim is in fact building on the historic waters claim. If there was still doubt as to how 
Canada viewed the waters, this was made very clear in 1985 when it, as a result of the 
Polar Sea voyage, established straight baselines around its northern archipelagic coast 
– baselines that represented “the outer limits of Canada`s historic internal waters”91.  
Many deal with the straight baselines as a separate justification to that of the historic 
waters, and to a certain extent it may function as such. Technically though, providing 
for straight baselines around its Archipelago was but a mere delineation of its claim of 
historic waters made in reference to Article 7
92
 of the UNCLOS.  
 
However, the essentials of the Canadian claim predate the UNCLOS (to which it 
acceded in 2003). This complicates matters. Whereas it now can point to Article 7 as 
a party to the UNCLOS, it could not in September of 1985. Instead it had to point to 
the Fisheries Case of 1951 and claim that the court`s line of reasoning in granting 
Norway a right to draw straight baselines around its extraordinary jagged northern 
coastline constituted customary international law and was applicable to the Canadian 
case as well. Investigating if or to what extent the Canadian northern coastline 
conforms with the criteria
93
 established by the Court is a rather technical matter, but it 
is precisely where the Canadian advocates would have to expel most of their 
argumentative energy if the validity of the straight baselines would ever be dealt with 
by third-party adjudication.  
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 As stated by Secretary of State for External Affairs Joe Clark when he announced the Order-in-
Council in the House of Commons in September 1985 (Lalonde & Macdonald 2007:67-68) 
92
 The article which in six small sections stipulates when and how baselines may be drawn.  
93
 Relating to the direction of the coastline, the close relationship between land and sea etc.  
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Unlike with the historic title claim, Pharand (2007:12-28) concludes that the straight 
baseline claim is valid. He sees no significant mismatch between the legal precedents 
established in the Fisheries Case and the Canadian coastline, the way the baselines 
have been drawn to conform to it and the supporting evidence the Canadians could 
put forth. His is but one opinion though, and seeing as though it has yet to be brought 
before third-party settlement procedures the jury is still out on the issue. 
An American could for instance question the validity of such a move by referring to 
Part IV on archipelagic states. By doing so he might succeed in disproving Canada`s 
right to draw baselines around its far-off islands and “bring them back”. The 
discussion would evolve around two points; whether or not the provisions in Part IV 
are applicable to more than just mid-ocean islands (Canada is clearly not one) and 
how to determine the land-to-mass-ratio (Article 47 paragraph 1) and Canada`s score. 
Even if the Canadian claims in regards to these two points were to gain recognition, 
one would still have to levy the right of archipelagic sea lane passage according to 
Article 53 which – in essence – would bring one right back to the American claim of 
the Passage being an international strait. A problem for Canada indeed. 
 
Canada is not the only nation claiming straight baselines. In fact, over 80 countries 
have since the Fisheries Case laid claim to straight baselines under Article 7 of the 
UNCLOS
94
. Through various forms of diplomatic maneuvering the US has opposed 
and protested about half of those. However, not being a party to the UNCLOS the US 
can`t invoke the binding dispute settlement procedures it contains.  
 
Although the two legal methods the Canadians are employing play off one another 
and are often dealt with as one, it is important to view them individually and have 
them “put to the trial” separately. The reason for this is that the results of such 
proceedings will have direct consequences for what navigational rights can be 
enjoyed by others; innocent passage or transit passage.  
If the Canadian historic title claim gained recognition then the waters would be 
defined as internal waters and no other state would have a right of innocent passage
95
. 
That right might very well exist, however, if the historic title claim is disregarded and 
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 Or under Article 4 of the UNCLOS I (the 1958 Geneva Convention) for those not party to the 
UNCLOS at the time of proclamation.  
95
 As is made explicit in Article 18 (see Articles 17 and 19 for context).  
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the only valid Canadian justification is its 1985 straight baselines move. Then Article 
8, section 2, would seem to activate and provide other states with the right of innocent 
passage seeing as though Canada had drawn baselines around waters which 
previously were not internal.  
In arguing the Canadian case one could conceivably claim that Article 8 constitutes a 
product of treaty law which did not exist when Canada proclaimed the straight 
baselines with reference to customary law in 1985. Some indeed do
96
. However, I do 
not see how they can escape the fact that Canada bound itself to this article (and all 
others
97
) when it ratified the UNCLOS in 2003. On the other hand, however, the very 
fact that Canada became a party to the convention in 2003, some 18 years after 
drawing the baselines, means that making the innocent passage provisions in the 
UNCLOS apply entails retroactively changing an established legal status – and that 
can hardly be completely unproblematic. So, in that sense they might be right. That is, 
not being party to the 1958 Territorial Sea Convention
98
 or the UNCLOS
99
 at the 
time, Canada could have been entitled in drawing the baselines in accordance with 
customary law and the waters behind them might have acquired a solid status as 
internal in the course of those 9/18 years. These are however contested positions. 
 
 
4.2.2 The American legal case 
 
The US rejects both of the Canadian claims, but more importantly it brings forth a 
core claim of its own; namely that the Northwest Passage equals an international 
strait which secures for the US a right of transit passage.  
An international strait is a sea corridor linking two oceans together which is used for 
international navigation. When making such a claim the US points to Part III of the 
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 For instance Donald McRae and Michael Byers. See Donald McRae, “Arctic Sovereignty?  What is 
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 With the exception of those pertaining to the areas which Article 298 allows for certain exemptions 
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 Part of UNCLOS I. 
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 Although opened up for signature in 1982, the UNCLOS was not in effect in 1985 seeing as though 
the required 60
th
 signatory didn`t come until 1994. Thus it cannot be argued that its provisions had 
gained the status as customary international law by 1985.  
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UNCLOS. The legal definition is, however, missing from the provisions laid out 
there, and the reason for it simple; the states could simply not agree on one. That 
means that turning to customary law is the only way to go. The US has consistently 
invoked the Corfu Channel case
100
 from 1949 wherein seemingly clear criteria were 
established. The geographic criterion states that for a legal strait to exist there needs 
to be an "overlap of territorial waters in the natural passage between land joining two 
parts of the high seas (or EEZ) or one part of the high seas (or EEZ) with the 
territorial sea of a foreign state" (Pharand 2007:34). In essence, this means that a legal 
strait needs to be narrower than 24 nautical miles and link two oceans together. 
Canada does not oppose that several key points in the Passage satisfy this criterion 
and, as such, the parties are in agreement on this matter. That cannot be said of the 
second criterion however. The functional criterion is the one which would occupy the 
lawyers` plates should the matter ever reach adjudication. It pertains to whether or not 
the strait in question has been used in such a manner as to qualify under the 
indeterminate tag-line "used for international navigation". The argument between the 
US and Canada on this matter is not primarily related to the exact number of ships 
that have ventured through the Passage over the years, the flags represented or even in 
what capacity they have sailed. The disagreement lies in the legal reading of the 
criterion itself. Whereas Canadians tend to count the number of transits in the 
Passage
101
 and claim that the non-consensual ones are way too few and far between to 
constitute usage, the US reads the Corfu case as clearly indicating that it is not the 
volume
102
 itself which is the pivot. Instead of the actual use, it is the potential use of 
the Passage for international maritime traffic which is the crux of the matter
103
. If that 
premise was to gain recognition then it wouldn`t matter how few ships had sailed it, 
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that there was a lack of deep water docks or any other circumstance.                                       
The ice was the impediment - and that impediment is literally melting away.  
Under the categorization "international strait" the American and other states` vessels 
would have the right of transit passage – similar to that of “walkers on footpaths 
through British farmland” (Byers 2009:42).   
 
If the American reading of the legal premises was not to prevail, the Passage could 
still end up becoming an international strait if more American or other foreign ships 
sailed the Passage without Canadian consent and the Canadians were unable to 
enforce its resistance. Given the potency of precedent, such a gradual process of 
internationalization would counter any perceived weakness in the American legal 
claim
104
.   
 
Canada was granted certain concessions in the wheeling and dealing of the UNCLOS 
III-negotiations. Article 234 is perhaps the most obvious one, and one which was 
dubbed “the Canadian exception”105. It gave proprietors of severely ice-covered areas 
the right to regulate marine pollution from vessels.  
The American response to the Canadian claims post-Polar Sea would be to point to 
Article 234 and ask “what does not Canada have under Article 234?”. From before it 
had control over the fish in the water and the oil and gas on the seabed. With Article 
234 it got the right to protect the pristine environment
106
. That essentially only leaves 
one thing
107
; namely the ability to control the passage of warships. Warships were in 
Article 236 made explicitly exempt from the rights given in Article 234. Plus, 
Americans would add, the control of warships is something Canada would not even 
have in its territorial sea.  
 
In the dispute, Article 234 actually seems to work in the benefit of the US more so 
than Canada – at least slightly so. Upon US ratification the Americans could choose 
to bring the article before adjudication to establish whether or not it can be said to 
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apply as the ice melts and leaves the areas ice-free all – or at least parts – of the year. 
It hardly seems likely that it can be. If the conditions for an Arctic/Canadian 
exception were to disappear, it means that Canada`s argumentative vantage point vis-
a-vis the Passage might be even weaker at some point in the future than it is now – 
and conversely stronger for the US.  
 
Unlike Canada, which has employed more than one justification through the years, 
the US has shown consistency in its claim vis-à-vis the Passage. This could represent 
an advantage when or if the time for adjudication comes.  
A quick glance back to the aftermath of the Manhattan voyage could serve as an 
example. In addition to launching the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act the 
Canadian government in 1970 also extended the territorial sea from three to 12 
nautical miles - not a huge issue in itself seeing as though many others countries had 
already done just this
108
. However, the extension had the effect of enclosing certain of 
the narrower parts of the Passage
109
, thus giving the Canadian authorities the 
opportunity to regard [parts of] the Passage as its territorial sea and apply [essentially] 
whatever laws it pleased to those vessels which had the right of innocent passage. At 
the same time, though, the historic internal waters argument began to surface with 
increasing propensity. Employing both of these arguments simultaneously soon 
proved difficult because internal waters are by definition not territorial sea and vice 
versa. The contradiction and confusion led Canada to have to choose, so to speak, 
which of the two it wanted to employ. The US, on the hand, has not been presented 
with such a conundrum. Sure, it has dabbled with refuting the Canadian claims from 
time to time, but it has first and foremost been advocating its own claim and has done 
so in a consistent manner. That could, as noted before, become an advantage
110
.  
 
4.3 US-Canadian relations 
Could Canada and the US go to war over this issue? In theory yes, but it is of course 
highly implausible in the foreseeable future and even beyond. The two haven`t stood 
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opposite one another in true armed conflict since the War of 1812 and although there 
did exist a theoretical framework outlining a potential third US invasion of Canada in 
the interbellum years
111
 much have changed since that time. The British Empire poses 
a threat to the US no more, two world wars and a cold one have to a large extent 
served to align their security policies and the amount of US-Canadian trade is 
unmatched in the world. Just to name a few things.  
This quote by former US President Kennedy serves to represent the amicable 
relationship - uttered in a speech to the Canadian parliament a few months after he 
took office in 1961;  
 
"Geography has made us neighbors. History has made us friends. Economics has 
made us partners. And necessity has made us allies. Those whom nature hath so 
joined together, let no man put asunder.” 
(The American Presidency Project 2010a) 
 
There are in fact so many levels of bilateral dependency and cooperation that it seems 
almost preposterous to see the Northwest Passage dispute as creating anything but the 
occasional diplomatic stir. Those can however be damaging enough in and of 
themselves.  
Keohane and Nye would also hold that the very nature of the subject matter - ocean 
politics - in and of itself would decrease the change for military conflict due to its 
global relevance and the way it ties states together.  
The causal part of their argument lies in the core expectation that increased 
interdependence should lead to more cooperation. And as the world becomes 
increasingly complex, cooperation is just what is needed to alleviate some of its ills 
and transcend the anarchy of the international system. 
 
The US and Canada have a long history of such cooperation, with regard to this topic 
matter as well. Just consider their joint proposal in 1960 to extend the territorial sea 
limits
112
 or the aforementioned 1988 Arctic Cooperation agreement. There are newer 
examples as well. A Memorandum of Cooperation was signed in 1999 to collaborate 
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in environmental and earth science. The two states have also established a 
Hydrographic Commission which seeks to figure out how to reflect unresolved 
boundary disputes (like the one in the Beaufort Sea) on maps and charts (Campbell 
2008:3).  
The ability to collaborate in functional terms even though the modus vivendi persists 
speaks volumes about the state of the US-Canada relationship, both in general and 
pertaining to ocean politics specifically.  
 
 
4.4 Room for a bilateral deal between the US and Canada? 
 
It might thus seem to be a puzzle that Canada and the US haven`t succeeded in 
forging a comprehensive bilateral agreement on the issue prior to it becoming a hot 
one.  
Should the issue be dealt with bilaterally or should it involve the rest of the world? 
Rather than answering that question flat out, I think it is proper to backtrack a bit and 
instead inquire; is the issue a bilateral one? 
 
If indeed it ever was, it is certainly not only a bilateral issue anymore - thanks to 
global warming. Since knowledge of global warming has begun to seep into the 
public`s awareness, people are starting to realize that the Northwest Passage dispute 
might not only be a bilateral US-Canadian issue. As an ocean-to-ocean strait
113
 with 
far-reaching consequences for the future, it pertains to the world at large.  
That means that the time for modus vivendi and ad-hoc arrangements of various sorts 
might be over. Continued ad-hoc arrangements between the US and Canada will not 
extend to the latter the legal authority to act vis-a-vis third parties which are deemed a 
risk. That is at the crux of the matter. If the Passage opens up and becomes a viable 
shipping lane, American vessels will not be the only foreign ones traversing the 
waters. Hence, internationally accepted authority is as important to Ottawa as, or even 
more than, acceptance in Washington.  
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Some might argue for leaving the Arctic be and point to the Antarctic Treaty for 
inspiration. Looking south for inspiration may very well be a good idea. It seems, 
however, implausible that a special treaty for the Arctic will materialize.                    
There are just too many points of difference for there to even be a fruitful comparison 
of the two. The Antarctica is a continent within itself and is surrounded by oceans. 
The Arctic, however, is in essence an ocean closely surrounded by land. The former is 
an uninhabited region
114
. The latter region is habited by (potentially) millions of 
people
115
. One has easily discernable boundaries, while the borders and limits of the 
other is a matter of contention. Sure, there are similarities too of course. Both regions 
are climatologically rough, probably packed with natural resources and undoubtedly 
environmentally pristine. The point is merely that the aforementioned factors, in 
combination with there already being an UNCLOS, do not speak well for a 
hypothetical (general) treaty for the Arctic Ocean.  
 
As I mentioned, there have been voices, both in the US and in Canada, calling for a 
special bilateral agreement as supposed to having the UNCLOS or any other 
multilateral treaty apply. There is no shortage of possible templates.  
One could for instance envision a deal that would allow Canada and the US to 
jointly manage the Passage, as they already do the St. Lawrence Seaway and the 
Great Lakes. This is reminiscent of the comprehensive Northwest Passage Authority 
(NWPA) which Brian Flemming (2008) at CDFAI
116
 has launched as a hypothetical 
proposal.  
Another way to go could be to include Denmark and build on the 1983 
Canada-Denmark Agreement for Cooperation relating to the Marine Environment to 
make for joint [tripartite] jurisdiction of all shipping over the North American 
continent (Canadian American Strategic Review 2009) 
 NAFTA could be a third possible template. If not a template, then at least a 
role model. The considerable free-trade agreement consolidated the co-operative 
nature of the US-Canadian relationship. Although issues under the NAFTA rarely if 
ever relate to matters of sovereignty, the two have shown they can come to agreement 
on the toughest of matters. Think of the softwood lumber dispute, which was one of 
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the lengthiest trade disputes in history. In 2006, the US and Canada chiseled out and 
signed an agreement which has more or less
117
 solved the quarter century old dispute. 
The agreement entailed compromises on both sides and, more importantly in this 
regard, set up a dispute settlement mechanism based around the London Court of 
International Arbitration
118
. Cases could be brought forth by both parties, the panel`s 
proceedings would be translucent and public, and the rulings would be binding. Four 
years on, the mechanism has been used on more than one occasion and seems to be 
working adequately.  
 
And yet, even though there are several potential templates out there, a bilateral 
agreement settling the Passage dispute seems very unlikely - especially after the 
Ilulissat Conference at the end of May 2008 where the five Arctic states signed a 
mutual declaration vowing to, among other things, “remain committed [to the 
UNCLOS] and to the orderly dispute settlement of any possible overlapping claims” 
(Arctic Council 2008).  
The UNCLOS is the appropriate template.  
Proper classification of the waters comes first. Then comes the accompanying 
jurisdictional entitlements under the UNCLOS.  
 
 
4.5 The American UNCLOS arguments conceptualized 
Rewind back to 2000/01.  
The Clinton administration left office with the UNCLOS at the top of its list of 
unratified treaties
119
. According to John B. Bellinger III (2008)
120
, the Bush 
administration picked up on that designation, passed it around to the various 
departments and government agencies and concluded after a long review process to 
support accession
121
. And it did so with more or less the same points of justification 
as its predecessor and successor.  
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Which are these points that evidently are so compelling that they were shared by two 
otherwise so dissimilar administrations? 
 
There are a myriad of more or less mythical conceptions about the potential impact of 
the UNCLOS on US interests, some more ludicrous than others.  
I think it will be wise not to handle them in the manner which UNCLOS` most eager 
proponents or opponents do. It is too ideological a matter.  
What is clear is that the UNCLOS touches on a wide range of US interests. 
Neo-functionalist thinker Ernst B. Haas once summed up some of the issues 
pertaining to regulating the seas; 
“fishing, mining, merchant shipping, pollution control, underwater communications, 
oceanographic research, innocent passage through territorial waters, recreation, 
maintenance of law and order, the peaceful settlement of disputes, conservation of all 
living resources of the sea, maritime safety and ownership of vessels, slavery, piracy, 
the drug traffic, the development and diffusion of new ocean-related technologies, the 
use of underwater nuclear explosions, arms control” (Haas in de Wilde 1991:14) 
These are some of the issues which ensure that ocean politics will be of the utmost 
strategic importance for the US.  
It is obviously difficult to pit either of these against one another and attempt to rank 
them – which is often necessary for argumentative purposes. What, then, is easier is to 
see that most of them are very much related issues and that is precisely how a 
superpower like the US must approach it.  
 
To answer my own question above, I could employ a few concise sentences from the 
plain-speaking former President.  
 
“First, I urge the Senate to act favorably on U.S. accession to the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea during this session of Congress.  Joining will serve 
the national security interests of the United States, including the maritime mobility of 
our armed forces worldwide.  It will secure U.S. sovereign rights over extensive 
marine areas, including the valuable natural resources they contain.  Accession will 
promote U.S. interests in the environmental health of the oceans.  And it will give the 
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United States a seat at the table when the rights that are vital to our interests are 
debated and interpreted” – Presidential Oceans Policy Statement May 15, 2007 
(The White House 2007) 
 
Bush seems to make clear the compelling points of justification. Ratifying the 
UNCLOS will strengthen national security, improve the military`s capability to 
project power globally, secure access to resources, promote ocean health and broad 
environmental concerns, and give the US a vote in debates, interpretations and dispute 
resolutions.  
Not a bad list indeed. 
And yet, there is staunch and fierce opposition from a certain segment in the 
populous, represented by a small group in the Senate. What does this opposition 
amount to?  
Instead of taking on each and every one of the many arguments against ratification, I 
have in the following chosen to group and conceptualize them into three over-arching 
conceptualizations. It is my contention that these catch and contain within them the 
spores to most of the opponents` concrete objections
122
.  
 
4.5.1 Creeping unqiueness 
 
Creeping uniqueness has become somewhat of a fashionable concept among the more 
intellectual of the UNCLOS skeptics and rears its face in the Passage dispute. The 
idea, of course, runs along the lines of; “because of some compelling local 
circumstance, normal rules do not apply”. Giving in to such a position is thought to be 
potentially harmful and could create a detrimental snowball effect by way of sending 
the wrong signal to not-so-benign countries whose waters surround some of the 
world`s more important straits. As such, it is not so much the Canadians and the 
Passage that is the concern. It is the Strait of Malacca and its immediate neighbors 
Indonesia and Malaysia (Macleans 2006). Or the Strait of Hormuz and its Iranian co-
proprietors. Or Libya and its claims in the Gulf of Sidra, to name a third example. If 
these states were to take the Canadian approach and gain recognition for doing so, 
they would be able to regulate and, essentially, block or at least circumscribe 
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American naval mobility in the straits. The end result would be that American vessels 
would be exposed to arbitrary and ever-changing rules and regulations around the 
world.  
To be fair, there is nothing extraordinary or new in the US insistence on keeping 
international straits and gateways open. Although different administrations have 
brought different flavors to the mix, US oceans policy has still been a very consistent 
entity for some two hundred years. Underlying it has been the fundamental and 
profound defense of the freedom of the seas doctrine and insistence on navigational 
mobility worldwide. This insistence has been made evident through action time and 
time again. It supported a separatist revolution
123
 and spent more than it had ever done 
on a single construction program up to that point to have the Panama Canal built. Or, 
to scurry back to present day, one could have a look at the continued American 
insistence on asserting US/Taiwanese interests in the South China Sea – an insistence 
which as late as in March of 2009 lead to quite a serious Chinese-US naval 
confrontation (New York Times 2009a).  
However, although a legitimate one, the US fear of setting a problematic precedent is 
to a lesser and lesser extent well founded. After all, and primarily because of the 
UNCLOS, the status of most of the straits and waterways around the world that the 
US has sought to maintain as international ones have been resolved or are in the 
process of being resolved (Byers & Lalonde 2006:31) - the crucial Strait of Malacca 
being one of the ones which is all but there
124
 (Koh 2007).  
 
 
4.5.2 Sovereignty 
 
“Striving not to make the Passage the Panama Canal of the 21st century” 
 
This is how the most eager opponents of the UNCLOS view their battle. They allude 
to Jimmy Carter`s Panama Canal Treaty of September 1977
125
 and claim UNCLOS is 
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an equally big “give-away” of US sovereignty126 and resources. It is not always easy 
to figure out the precise logic which underlines this view. For some, it is the funding 
of the ISA (which is seen as a global tax), for some it is the mandatory dispute 
settlement mechanism and for some it is simply the mere idea of multilateralism. All 
are however seen as diminutions of sovereignty/autonomy.  
 
In actual fact, with respect to the increased resource jurisdiction the US would 
[probably] legally acquire by acceding to the UNCLOS, the numbers are quite 
staggering. The [geographical] areas that would fall under US control would be 
greater than those of the Louisiana Purchase and the acquisition of Alaska in 
combination – two cases which is often referred to as having been fantastic deals for 
the US and great feats of diplomacy, even by the most skeptical of UNCLOS skeptics. 
It would represent a doubling of the current American share in the Arctic.  
However, the opponents do not see it like that. American business interests can 
already exploit resources on the high seas and preeminent military power protects the 
US from foreign encroachment.  
For them it might all appear quite reminiscent of two other vital moments in US 
history; the Jay Treaty of 1795 and the Treaty of Versailles from 1919. Both treaties 
caused quite a stir and faced strong opposition (and indeed amendment) in Senate due 
to the perceived way in which they diminished US sovereignty. Professor Bederman 
(2008) might very well be on to something when he draws lines of similarity between 
these two treaties and the UNCLOS. What he is essentially proposing, without 
voicing it explicitly, is that there is something innate in parts of the American 
character which purports to isolationism when faced with possible participation in 
more or less formal international institutions and authorities. Not subjugation by, but 
participation in.   
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58 
If the fears of “sovereignty give-away” were mainly to relate specifically to the 
aversion to mandatory third-party settlement procedures
127
 then it must be noted that 
this is in no way representative of something new in US politics. This aversion has led 
the US to reject many an international initiative through the years; 
- The 1907 Central American Court of Justice 
- The Taft Arbitration Treaties of 1911 
- The League of Nations and the Permanent Court of International Justice 
it set up 
- The 1961 Optional Protocol concerning the Compulsory Settlement of 
Disputes (which was tied in with the UNCLOS I-treaties of 1958) 
- The Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
(Noyes 2009) 
In addition to these examples, I would also mention its notoriously halfway-approach 
to the International Court of Justice.  
This aversion obviously also rears its head in the matter of the UNCLOS, where it is 
deemed to have an unfavorable impact on national security.  
However, the fact that it cannot be ascribed to the vocal opponents alone is made 
evident by how the SFRC has dealt with the UNCLOS. When it issued its latest 
favorable Advice and Consent Resolution it nonetheless took advantage of Article 
298 section 1b and declared military activities exempt from all third-party dispute 
settlement procedures and added that the US would take it upon itself to be the judge 
of what constitutes military activities
128
. Perhaps not a shocking move in and of itself, 
but it does play into the idea of there being something American in the unease with 
multilateralism, not just something pertaining to the vocal right-wingers.  
 
Regardless of which concrete arguments they tie to their objection, the opponents of 
the UNCLOS all seem to conform to a simple but crucial premise; that the US does 
not need to accede to it. By virtue of its tremendous power the US can merely “shoot 
its way” through disputes and altercations at sea. This is in my opinion a position 
fraught with faults. Let me mention a couple of the most important ones.  
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First of all, many of the disputes that the US has been a party to, including the 
one to which the brunt of the light is shed in this thesis, have involved other 
democracies. To intimidate states like Chile, Canada or India into submission may not 
only place a burden on their respective friendships with the US. It could also be 
counterproductive to several of the broader principles the US have been trying to push 
for years and years; like multilateralism instead of unilateralism, negotiation rather 
than bullying and generally; the rule of law as supposed to anarchy.  
Secondly, it rests on an inherently temporary premise; that the US will remain 
militarily preeminent well into the distant future. This might be the case, but if history 
is any indication the hegemony will be lost at some point
129
. As reflective of their 
view on power, Keohane and Nye argue along the same lines, although not with 
reference to history. They contend that it is unlikely that the superpower will remain 
hegemonic for eternity because of the changing facets of the notion of power. The 
idea is that as states (and non-states) become increasingly intertwined, the superpower 
will focus more on the (economic and social) gains and benefits it can reap within the 
new globalized system instead of necessarily worrying about another state increasing 
its military capability
130
 - unless of course it has obvious malign intentions (Keohane 
& Nye 1977:42-49?). And it is not particularly relevant either. With increased 
interdependence comes a necessary downgrading of the option of military threat. 
Power, then, have moved beyond being just the sum of resources and military 
capabilities into also involving the appeal of soft power
131
. Still, when or if the point 
comes that the US is matched in a strict militaristic sense, it can no longer rely on its 
fist and will undoubtedly be more prone to negotiation and hedging. By not 
voluntarily having explored more multilateral arrangements while still being a 
superpower, much potential goodwill will have been lost
132
.  
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they see as the black and white of Waltz` realism.  
131
 A state`s ability (through co-option and attraction) to alter the behavior of other states and get them 
to do what it wants (Nye 2004) 
132
 Here, political goodwill is seen as an investment.  
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4.5.3 In dubio pro natura? 
 
Although there are problems with his general position
133
, I do believe that Lawrence 
A. Kogan hones in on something interesting when he speaks of a legal competition 
between the US and other nations (implicitly, this means Europe at large) of how to 
infer and interpret the core principles set forth both by the freedom of the seas 
doctrine and the environmental and economic provisions of the UNCLOS (Kogan 
2009). The pivot, according to Kogan, is the so-called precautionary principle
134
, 
which he sees as a European entity that is permeating the UNCLOS and would 
considerably alter both US law and the manner in which the US deals with 
international law. Or rather; alter the legal norms with which the US is used to 
operating. The premise is, of course, that the US was to accede to the treaty.   
Although it might seem to perplex him that the principle is seeping into the US, I do 
not believe this to be the case. Albeit it a rather new concept in US case law, the 
precautionary principle has been a talking point within environmental milieus since 
the early 1980s and really got a foothold through specific references in important 
environmental conferences a decade later
135
 and particularly with the newly 
conceived EU adopting it as a guiding principle. Although late to follow suit, the US 
now seems destined to have their legislation affected as well - as witnessed by the 
landmark 2003 decision of the city of San Francisco
136
 to have the principle underline 
all its environmental policies (City of San Francisco 2003). It, combined with other 
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 Which essentially is a not-so-well concealed intellectual defense of the American legal standard, to 
the disfavor of the European counterpart and, in this case, the UNCLOS itself. It makes the case that 
the UNCLOS has got so far-reaching legal environmental consequences that the Senate must vet it and 
its consequences in a multi-committee fashion. In fact, March, April and May of 2004 saw the Senate 
Environment and Public Works Committee, the Senate Armed Service Committee and the House 
International Relations Committee all holding hearings on the UNCLOS.  
134
 From the original German phrase Vorsorgeprinzip. The precautionary principle is the legal (and 
moral and political) principle which states that when human activities may lead to morally 
unacceptable and/or irreversible  harm (to the environment or human health) that is scientifically 
plausible but uncertain, actions shall be taken to avoid or diminish that harm. It thus alters the burden 
of proof – placing it on the opposite side. The precautionary principle closely borders other adjacent 
judicial norms, like sustainable development and earth jurisprudence.  
135
 The most famous of which is probably the Rio Declaration of 1992 and its Principle 15 (Science & 
Environmental Health Network 2003) 
136
 Generalizing from famously liberal and progressive San Francisco alone is not entirely 
unproblematic. There are however heaps of other federal and state laws that are clearly precautionary 
in intent, if not in black letter, like The Clean Water Act (1972) or the Endangered Species Act (1973). 
The Food Quality and Protection Act (1996) is an example of one of the rather new laws which clearly 
possesses codified precautionary elements.  
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new legislation and an assumed US accession to the UNCLOS, would seem to prove 
that the legal competition is no more – if it ever was. Although most certainly not 
there yet, the US is moving toward making the precautionary principle the rule as 
supposed to the exception. One would expect there to be quite a strong correlation 
between this movement and an expected movement toward an accession of the 
UNCLOS. But as the dictum states; correlation does not necessarily imply causation. 
Not only have all branches of government slowly begun to incorporate facets 
of precaution in environmental regulation and the interpretation of which. If one takes 
a look at the actual content, it is also evident that some kind of movement towards 
understanding environmental ills as global ones is occurring
137
.  
The domestic legal trend, however slow-moving and implicit it might be at this point,  
thus seems to be paying tacit reverence not only to the precautionary principle, but 
also to the equivalence principle – that which secures more or less the same treatment 
of environmental harms regardless of whether they occur within one`s boundaries or 
not. My point is merely to indicate that there is by no means perfect congruence 
between the American treaty record and its domestic legal actions.   
 
In itself the precautionary principle is not a particularly powerful tool of decision-
making. It is more a moral-philosophical backdrop against which politics are 
conducted. Precautionary intent means nothing unless there is enforcement on the 
other side. Some would however argue, like Speth and Haas (2006:102) does in 
Global Environmental Governance, that weak enforcement is not the crucial flaw of 
treaties like the UNCLOS. The problem lies in the fact that the treaties themselves are 
too weak and not ambitious enough. This seems like a valid point when measured 
against a high standard of efficiency. But are extreme highs or absolutes the way to 
go? In as far as the treaties ought to reflect the ultimate goals, they are weak. In 
practice though, it makes little sense to deem, say, the UNCLOS as ineffective 
because its provisions on fisheries have not lead to rejuvenation of all fish species – to 
name one example.  
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 An example of which can be the National Environmental Policy Act which contains an explicit 
order  directed at the agencies to “recognize the worldwide and long-range character of environmental 
problems and, where consistent with the foreign policy of the United States, lend appropriate support to 
initiatives, resolutions, and programs designed to maximize international cooperation in anticipating 
and preventing a decline in the quality of mankind's world environment” (NEPA section 102, F) 
(Council on Environmental Quality 2010).  
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The reason why the precautionary principle even matters in relation to the topic 
matter is obviously because it would, if it becomes a widely accepted norm, give 
states, like Canada and others, a legal basis from which to restrict and affect US naval 
mobility by way of invoking environmental concerns. And invoking such concerns is 
no tall task as there are no shortages of examples to point to. Let`s take the crucial 
Strait of Hormuz in the Persian Gulf as an example. In January 2007 the US nuclear 
submarine USS Newport News was sucked up
138
 by the supertanker M/V 
Mogamigawa sailing the waters above and collided with the 300 000 ton Japanese 
vessel. Another example is the 2009 occurrence where US nuclear submarine USS 
Hartford collided with the transport dock USS New Orleans in March. As chance 
would have it, no environmental harm were incurred in the former case, whereas the 
latter led to the spilling of 25 000 gallons of diesel (New York Times 2009b). 
“Imagine if it had been vice versa”, Canadians would say while pointing to the 
Northwest Passage as a possible future venue for such an environmental tragedy.  
 
 
 
 
One of the interesting aspects of the current UNCLOS debate in the US is the fact that 
it can no longer be analyzed within a straight forward partisan paradigm. This was 
more the case under President Reagan in the 1980s, where this and other issues 
seemed to take on a more ideological spin.  
Nowadays it is different. With former President Bush, several of his top liaisons, 
vocal incumbent GOP senators like mrs. Murkowski, Dick Lugar, Ted Stevens and 
others in support of ratification, the Republican caucus is itself divided and one has to 
look to the right fringe of the party to find the opponents in the likes of mr. Inhofe, 
mr. DeMint, mr. Vitter etc. The latter ones base their claims on deeply felt 
dogmatic
139
 views of the importance of US national sovereignty and skepticism 
toward multilateral arrangements.  
                                                 
138
 The venturi effect was thought to be the culprit (Pilot Online 2007) 
139
 To utilize the word “dogma” is dangerous in the sense that it for some carries negative 
connotations. In the true sense of the word it does not carry any connotations, neither positive nor 
negative, and this is the version I am employing.  
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However, insofar as Reagan had ideological considerations at heart when rejecting the 
treaty back in the 80s he nevertheless formulated his opposition in concrete and 
specific political objections. These have since been specifically addressed. Or have 
they?   
 
I will in the following section look into the US skepticism toward the UNCLOS 
through the prism of the Reaganite era. It is my contention that this is a period which 
had formative effects and encapsulates many of the attitudes of UNCLOS-detractors 
today.  
 
4.6 Reagan`s official objections 
 
The official American objections were laid out in the “Statement on United States 
Participation in the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea” of 
January 29
th
 1982 (The American Presidency Project 2010b). Although vague in its 
semantic build-up
140
, the statement indicates that the Reagan administration refused to 
sign primarily due to the provisions related to deep sea bed mining in Part XI (and 
Annexes III and IV).  
More specifically it found the powers given to the ISA (an organ set up to govern the 
seabed and its activities) fundamentally unacceptable in that the two-thirds majority 
voting system could leave the US and other industrialized states at the mercy of the 
developing world`s will. Or to put it in another way; that the influence the US was 
given was incommensurate with its interests (and the amount its companies would 
contribute to the ISA budget).  Secondly, the ISA would sell exploration & 
exploitation licenses and set up a commercial arm of its own which down the line 
would be able to compete for licenses with other companies. This management 
strategy might ring familiar to Norwegians with any knowledge of how Norway chose 
to handle it when it struck oil in the late 1960s, but for the Reagan administration it 
smelled of public enterprise
141
 and it was thus inconsistent with the free market 
philosophy so heeded in the US.  
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 Which necessitates a certain level of interpretation.  
141
 Which, to be fair, it was. It was even called the Enterprise in the UNCLOS text and was meant to 
be funded by mining states and receive the necessary technological know-how from them as well. It 
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Third, the idea that this Enterprise was to be (in essence) subsidized by mining states 
and that the latter`s companies would be forced to transfer technology to it and 
developing nations
142
, was equally unacceptable. Fourth was the objection to the fact 
that there was no assured access to future deep seabed mineral resources and that 
production ceilings were likely to be introduced. 
 
The fact that it was Part XI and accompanying annexes which constituted the problem 
was explicitly reiterated by President Reagan in his 1983 Oceans Policy Statement 14 
months later;  
 
“We have taken this step [of refusing to sign the UNCLOS] because several major 
problems in the Convention's deep seabed mining provisions are contrary to the 
interests and principles of industrialized nations and would not help attain the 
aspirations of developing countries” 
(Ronald Reagan Presidential Library 2010) 
 
 
4.6.1 The Reagan objections revisited 
 
Alas, it is not necessarily such a straight forward task to interpret the Reagan 
administration and its position. There has been some controversy as to what were his 
true rationàle for going against the advice of Secretary of State Alexander Haig and 
others around him who favored the treaty. Some of the ones who still vehemently 
oppose ratification are not deterred by those (like former Reagan aides Baker & 
Schultz
143
) who say the `94 Agreement mended all the cracks and imperfections 
Reagan pointed to. They claim that the scope of his objections went wider than that 
which was uttered officially back in his tenure. That it was not so much about the 
technicalities of Part XI as what these were taken to represent for Reagan and many 
                                                                                                                                           
would then be in a position to best safeguard the sea bed resources in line with the “common heritage 
of  mankind”-tag  
142
 The treaty contained provisions which sought to lift forth so-called liberation movements in 
developing countries by way of, what in essence would be, subsidies from the mining states (i.e. the 
US). Not only was the US opposed to the principle. The administration also noted, with a sense of 
disgust, that such liberation movements would at that time include the likes of PLO, to name one 
example.  
143
 See page 72. 
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with him. Or to put it in a slightly different way; that Part XI was merely a 
manifestation of the wider conceptual and ideological problems the President had 
with the UNCLOS.  
This is a very valid point which deserves analytical attention.  
 
Although evidence is scarce, their argument seems to rest on two things, one being 
proof of better quality than the other.  
First, the best piece of evidence is perhaps the diary entry of June 29
th
 1982 which 
essentially made it clear that mr. Reagan was not inclined to sign the treaty even if 
there were no provisions on seabed mining
144
. If taken as a reflection of a consistent 
personal view (as opposed to a temporary one), it would seem to directly contradict 
the official position as reflected through public statements and the official Ocean 
Policy Statement of March 1983 (National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 
2010). The point should be made, though, that this diary entry was made after a 
several months-long negotiation process to alter the treaty text into a more pro-US 
one seemed to come to an unsuccessful end. Like I mentioned, then, the entry could 
conceivably have been a reflection of frustration more than that of a consistent view. 
Still, a diary entry is generally a more reliable source than second-hand accounts – 
especially if it is to be employed to shed light on Reagan`s personal opinion.  
 
Second is the fact that chief UNCLOS negotiator for Reagan, James Malone, went on 
record more than a decade later (and after the `94 Agreement) confirming his 1984 
justification
145
 and making it unequivocally clear that Part XI was by no means the 
only objection the President had. Instead it was the collectivist and redistributionist 
nature of the treaty as a whole which put him off. This is ample evidence of the fact 
that these are deeply felt political views that are not to be construed as temporal 
ideology. However, whether or not mr. Reagan personally shared those deeply felt 
views is a question which is not necessarily addressed by mr. Malone publicly stating 
his opinion.   
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 The actual diary entry reads as following; "Decided in [National Security Council] meeting -- will 
not sign 'Law of the Sea' treaty even without seabed mining provisions." (Reagan/Brinkley 2007:90) 
145
 The US Senate 2007:25.  
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What strengthens Malone`s arguments is the fact that he by no means is the only 
former top Reagan liason who argue along these lines. William P. Clark
146
 and Edwin 
Meese
147
 are two others who are doing the same. In an article from 2007 they argue 
that the `94 Agreement did little in mending Reagan`s concerns about a treaty which 
had “mutated beyond recognition from an effort to codify certain navigation 
rights…..into a dramatic step toward world government” (Wall Street Journal 2007) 
Once again the President`s larger, contextual objections are in focus.  
Their line of reasoning is supported by various anecdotal evidence and arguments, 
which for the most part are easy enough to crosscheck. Like for instance the claim 
that mr. Reagan so opposed the treaty that he dispatched a [young] Donald 
Rumsfeld
148
 to key allies to explain the US objections and entice them to follow suit 
in not signing it. This was in fact the case. Mr. Rumsfeld travelled abroad in October 
and November of 1982 and got 10 Downing Street and other western European allies, 
as well as the Japanese, on board (Earney 1990:44).  
None of the other claims that are made are particularly surprising (or flawed for that 
matter). Reagan had indeed been a critic of Jimmy Carter and the perceived weak 
hand with which he handled US interests in the wake of growing demands from third 
world countries. This had been evident for quite some time, but the presidential 
campaign in 1980 served to illuminate it thoroughly when Reagan promised to fully 
re-examine US foreign policy and mentioned the UNCLOS negotiations specifically. 
In fact, the law of the sea topic was one of the very few international ones he 
specifically mentioned on the campaign trail
149
.  
 
Although Reagan initially pulled the US from the UNCLOS process and began 
designing a set of alternative seabed mining agreements with other states
150
, he 
decided to return to the negotiations in early 1982. Why this occurred is hard to 
pinpoint. One could perhaps attribute it to mr. Reagan`s objections to the `package 
deal` orientation of the treaty, as this “implied the acceptance of some form of linkage 
                                                 
146
 Served as National Security Adviser under Reagan. 
147
 Served as Attorney General under Reagan.  
148
 Then President Reagan`s special envoy to the UNCLOS. It was a part-time position he held 
alongside being CEO of a pharmaceutical company.  
149
 The campaign trail featured almost exclusively domestic issues and a wide variety at that. The Iran 
hostage crisis and Reagan`s vow to seek out “peace through strength” were in addition to the matter of 
UNCLOS two of the few international ones that came up during the course of the campaign.  
150
 (Earney 1990:44f) 
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between the various packages being debated simultaneously and of some give and 
take on the part of both the G77 and the United States” (Schmidt 1989:308). Such 
linking strategies were (as assumed by Keohane & Nye) undoubtedly employed by 
the G77-countries as they were tying elements of the UNCLOS negotiations, 
particularly those of Part XI, to calls for a NIEO. As such the move might have been 
an attempt to entice other nations away from the `package deal` principle, or at least 
to test the waters a bit. Alas, it led to no significant rapprochement on that matter.   
What is nonetheless clear is that his negotiators succeeded in forcing changes to the 
treaty document in those final months of deliberations. They were evidently not 
sufficient enough though, because President Reagan refused to sign the treaty when 
negotiations were concluded – perhaps due to ideological objections, as the diary 
entry might indicate.  
 
One should remember that Reagan`s US was not alone in its views. Amid the 
conservative wind that blew in the 1980`s, several other countries in the West had 
objections which ran more or less along the same lines as the Americans`. Perhaps not 
as profound or ideologically construed as the latter`s, but objections nonetheless. 
Hence, none of the major powers, be it the UK, (West) Germany or France, signed on 
during the first round. Instead they waited until the Reaganite altercations to the deep 
seabed mining regime were made in the 90s (Schmidt 1989:307). This is an important 
point to bring forth inasmuch as it brings nuance to the view that the UNCLOS was 
universally supported right away. It was not, and in fact most NATO states did not 
join until after the `94 Agreement was in place.  
 
Although Reagan himself never officially said anything to the effect, several of his 
top liaisons used the word socialist to refer to concepts in the treaty or even the treaty 
as a whole. James Malone, for instance, did so on several occasions when speaking 
of, among other facets of the treaty, the redistributionist principles he felt permeated 
the treaty (Malone 1983:31). Both Congress and the executive branch did however 
agree that it was based “on principles of central planning and controlled economy” 
(Mielke 1995). I would submit that this is about as socialist a description can be 
without being explicitly so. And irrespective of taking into account the `94 Agreement 
or not, it is difficult to argue against the fact that the treaty, as a whole, bears with it at 
least a moderate critique of capitalism and the forces of market.  
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The two-headed approach I have touched upon numerous times in this thesis seems to 
somehow be US-specific – like being something inherent in the American character. 
To revolt back to isolationism and/or unilateralism at various intervals, and at the 
expense of its heartfelt desire to engage the world, both at sea and on land. Reagan 
would perhaps not have dubbed it two-headed. He, like most of his peers, would more 
likely have pointed to the exceptional nature of the US. That is, the collective sense of 
the American self and the way in which it cannot be construed in ways others can. I 
am essentially speaking of exceptionalism as closely linked, and perhaps even 
interchangeable, with notions of one`s identity or character.  
 
 
4.7 Exceptionalism - a formative norm? 
 
Appeals of America`s exceptionalism is nothing new. As Simpson and Wheeler 
(2007) see it, this exceptionalism, and the back-and-forth motion between reverence 
for international law and `going at it alone` it precipitates, can be traced all the way 
back to the nation`s special inception.  
“…the revolutionary aspirations of the American Republic run up against the 
constraining tendencies of the international legal order, and this tension can be seen 
in relation to the question of whether the United States should be granted [or rather; 
grant itself] exceptional rights or a form of extralegal sovereign exceptionalism” 
(Simpson&Wheeler in Biersteker et al 2007:121).  
This helps put into perspective the legalized hegemony
151
 the US seems to be 
reverting back to at various but cyclical intervals, whether it would be as observed 
through the Bush Doctrine or through the design of permanent seating at the UN 
Security Council.  
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 The exception in law or great power prerogatives, to put it in a simpler form.  
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American exceptionalism is a difficult concept to streamline into easy interpretation. 
This is because it touches on so many aspects, has taken many a form and is 
susceptible to partisan contention.  
It holds that the rule of law is a much heeded premise and that American should lead 
the world, all the while it stresses the primacy of domestic law.  
It is closely correlated to the party structure in the US, but is more a reflection of the 
American character than that of, say, the Republican Party alone. 
 
Unlike Gerry Simpson and Nicholas J. Wheeler`s rather generic application, others 
tend to deal with American exceptionalism in a more nuanced manner. Svein Melby 
(1995) would probably not disagree with Simpson and Wheeler`s descriptions, but 
pits exceptionalism within a more traditional realism vs idealism scheme. He 
obviously sees American exceptionalism as belonging more to the latter category, but 
claims, implicitly, that American idealism is something quite different than idealism 
elsewhere. This is due to the two faces or perspectives of the American 
exceptionalism; the sense of escape
152
 and the manifest destiny
153
. Together they form 
“an idealized American self image” (Melby 1995:21) and it is in the range between 
these two that the idealistic component of US foreign policy is created. This will 
obviously have to fuse with certain realist components, but the idealist component of 
US foreign policy has almost always been the most important contributor. This is not 
the least of which due to the central place ideas hold in the American context
154
. Thus, 
as the point of gravity shifts between the sense of escape and the manifest destiny 
perspectives, American foreign policy bears with a “significant latent potential” for 
instability and credibility issues (Ibid:29-35).  
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 A perspective that focuses on the power of example and holds that the best way in which American 
values and ideals can have appeal to others is to be a city upon a hill. This strand of idealism was 
particularly prevalent in the earlier periods of the American republic, but still plays a part in foreign 
policy thinking today. Proponents of the sense of escape perspective will favor a defensive and 
introverted approach and would much rather want to be an empire by invitation than the opposite. 
Consequently, the US can at times be pitted as the reluctant superpower (Melby 1995:22-25) 
153
 A perspective that favors an extroverted and offensive approach to foreign policy. It plays on the 
age-old notion from the expansive mid 19
th
 century of the US having a god-given right to project its 
values, norms and way of thinking to others. Proponents of the manifest destiny direction would like to 
see the US actively engage the world in an offensive and assertive fashion. This is due to the need to 
both protect America and also see to it that America reaches its goals abroad (Melby 1995:25-27).  
154
 Unlike most other nation-states, the US was constructed on the basis of certain ideas, as supposed to 
geography, ethnicity, culture etc. These ideas, be it capitalism, personal liberty or democracy, are thus 
inexplicitly tied to the very existence of the nation itself.  
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There are two points to be made here. First, although that potential has rather negative 
connotations at face value, it can also be a positive force in that it can facilitate for 
real and significant change in the foreign policy
155
, if the political wind were to blow 
in favor of that – which some would claim was the case after the last US presidential 
campaign. Second, in order to facilitate for a predictable, powerful and credible US 
foreign policy there seems to be a need for a larger, operational concept (Ibid:32). 
These, be it for instance containment, rapprochement or protectionism, will, if well 
formed and suited to the political reality they are applied, counter the disintegrative 
effects of the dichotomy within idealism and even between realism and idealism.  
 
There are many ways of dissecting and analyzing American foreign policy. Focusing 
on the dynamic between realism and idealism is but one. Calling it pragmatism vs 
moralism is another. Walter Russell Mead`s historic approach in which he identifies 
four different foreign policy schools
156
 is yet another. Or perhaps one would want to 
leave Mead`s classifications be and instead focus on four different stereotypical 
foreign policy personalities; the realists, the institutionalists, the expansionists and the 
isolationists.   
 
Although the different ways of looking at US foreign policy have a tendency to cut 
across each other, they also bring nuances within their own right. Nuances that help 
paint a more comprehensible picture of US foreign policy and the framework within 
which the exceptionalism originates. Such a complex approach is after all needed, 
given the difficulty of deciphering US foreign policy in quick and easy ways. 
George W. Bush, the 43
th
 president, can serve as an example. When taking 
over after Bill Clinton in January of 2001 it was widely expected that the domestically 
focused Bush jr. would conduct foreign policy rather similar to that of his father, a 
realpolitik-styled administration if there ever was one. This did not turn out to be the 
case. Within six months of his presidency the 9/11 terrorist attacks took place and 
they lead to a significant foreign policy re-write
157
. 
Whether these foreign policy changes resulted from the President himself having an 
epiphany or because the events of 9/11 gave way to a political sentiment which in turn 
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 Which is a policy field that for most nations are characterized by stability. 
156
 Named after four noted characters in US history; each of which brought a particular flavor to 
conducting foreign policy; Jackson, Hamilton, Wilson and Jefferson.  
157
 The new platform would probably best be described in the Bush Doctrine of 2002.  
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empowered certain neo-conservative elements in his vicinity, is difficult to know 
precisely. And it is perhaps not so interesting either. The policies ought to be taken for 
what they were. Far from being something new or even something exclusively neo-
conservative, his foreign policy actually gave heed to many core American foreign 
policy traditions; the efforts to pave the way for democracy in the Middle East would 
resonate quite well with Wilson; the willingness to take on the enemy head on would 
certainly please Jackson; the unyielding focus on inherent American values like 
liberty would play well to the likes of Jefferson who, like JFK or Reagan, would 
employ the term city upon a hill as a core virtue; and although Hamilton hated 
Jefferson
158
, there was definitely some of the former there as well, for instance in the 
relentless trust in the free-market ideology and the willingness to employ it as 
leverage. Four different US foreign policy traditions which essentially share but one 
core characteristic; the belief that the US has a special place in the world. That the US 
is exceptional, if you will.  
 
This, then, highlights the difficulty of pitting real-life policies into simplified 
descriptive boxes. Although every administration`s foreign policy will spring from 
these traditions
159
, it is however still very much worth analyzing – but then to do it 
with the aim of ascertaining the tilt or tendency of it, or rather; ascertaining which 
traditions are in the foreground and which are pushed back. Consequently, one can pit 
George W. Bush`s presidency as primarily a Jacksonian-Wilsonian one, or make the 
distinction between his two terms – the second of which was less expansionist both in 
tone and style than the first. It is thus perhaps not so surprising that it was in the 
second term he found room for voicing his official embrace of an accession to the 
UNCLOS.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
158 Hate is perhaps too strong a word, insofar as Hamilton ended up backing Jefferson for president. 
Still, there were enough disagreement on policies and personality traits to justify its use.  
159
 With the possible exception of the most isolationist strains of Jeffersonianism, which to a large 
degree have been marginalized since the 1950s (Melby 2004:47).  
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4.8 The congressional hold-up 
 
Getting the UNCLOS ratified in the Senate will in many respects be a massive critical 
test for the old Washington axiom which states that multilateral treaties die and wither 
away once they reach the Senate floor
160
. For seldom have the odds been stacked in 
such a manner against continued non-ratification. The Democrats control the White 
House and still have supermajority
161
 in the Senate, however fragile it might be. Both 
the Pentagon central command and all top ranking Navy and Coast Guard generals 
favor ratification. So does all relevant Departments at the bureaucratic level. In 
addition, support is also to be found from a huge cluster of interest groups, some of 
whom rarely if ever unite in policy issues. Representatives for the big oil and gas 
companies; environmentalists; the entire fishing and shipping industries; Wall Street; 
most communities along the coast; veterans; huge players within the military-
industrial complex. A group of strange bedfellows for sure.  
To top it off, even two of Reagan`s own leading men from the 80s, James A. Baker
162
 
and George P. Schultz
163
, have come out publicly saying that their former boss` major 
objections have long been resolved and that “it is clearly time for the Senate to act” 
[and see through an accession] (Baker & Schultz 2007). And they are not the only 
Republicans who feel that way.    
 
The problem clearly lies with select parts of the legislative caucus. The entire 
previous administration supported accession. President Bush, his powerful next-in-
command Dick Cheney, the Navy and the rest of Pentagon. And yet, it was unable to 
get it through the Senate. The difference nowadays is of course the fact that the 
Democrats hold both the White House and Congress. In theory this would not seem to 
make the process of getting the bill to the full Senate floor an easier one, inasmuch as 
the problem lies with the GOP hardliners and the procedural make-up of the Senate, 
and not with the Democrats. Still, in practice, dual control in Washington usually 
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 As fate would have it with so many other treaties, the most famous of which are probably the 
International Criminal Court, the Kyoto protocol, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and the Land 
Mine Treaty (Mead 2002:290)  
161
 Which would enable a majority to suppress a filibuster attempt by invoking cloture.  
162
 Served as Chief of Staff and Secretary of the Treasury under Reagan.  
163
 Served as Secretary of State under Reagan.   
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makes for good leverage in seeing off filibusters
164
. Whether this occurs through force 
or patience is uncertain thus far.  
As witnessed by President Obama`s successful venture in turning
165
 moderate GOP 
senator Olympia Snowe on the crucial healthcare issue in October of last year (The 
Telegraph 2009), creating movements within GOP ranks is possible on even the 
toughest and most ideological of issues.  
 
Several of the UNCLOS opponents in the Senate are not representing particularly 
ocean-conscious constituencies, nor are they even coming from states with shorelines.  
Given that quite a few senators are on the fence on the UNCLOS matter, it is perhaps 
best to just look at those who have clearly and officially made their opposition known, 
through voting or otherwise. Senator Inhofe has long been one of the more vocal 
opponents of the UNCLOS and he is representing Oklahoma – a landlocked state. As 
are Kentucky and Minnesota, the states of senators McConnell and Coleman 
respectively – two other acknowledged opponents.   
This, coupled with the nature of their arguments, leads to the obvious deduction that 
their opinions and concerns about the UNCLOS are founded along more 
philosophical and ideological lines than that of pleasing constituencies` particular 
interests. Several other GOP hardliners from coastal states (who on other issues are 
usually quite closely aligned with the aforementioned characters) have in the 
UNCLOS matter been forced to support accession - former Governor and vice-
presidential candidate Sarah Palin being but one example.  
 
During President Clinton`s reign it was Senator Jesse Helms who acted as the main 
brake, denying the treaty to be considered in Senate. After he stepped down in 2001 
and the position of Chairman went to (first) Joe Biden and (then) Dick Lugar it 
quickly (and unanimously) passed through the Foreign Relations Committee in 2004, 
and then again in 2007.  
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 On the UNCLOS matter specifically, there is little doubt that initiating a standard filibuster would 
serve the minority little good. Both a Democratic supermajority and the mere fact that the issue is not 
really a partisan one would secure fairly easy roads to successfully invoking cloture or, at the very 
least, changing Senate rules. Instead, one would have to rely on old-school concession eliciting and 
debt collecting.  
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 Not without having to make concessions, obviously. The price for mrs. Snowe`s vote would be to 
cut the public option.  
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If the axiom holds true and the administration fails to get the Senate`s approval, it 
once again underscores the status-quo orientation of the US constitutional system. 
This would come as no surprise to anyone with some knowledge of the US and 
certainly not the Founding Fathers who, among other things, had this very concern at 
heart when drafting the Constitution. Its system of checks and balances ensures on the 
one hand that neither of the three branches of government can override the others, 
while on the other hand it gives, say, potentially very small minorities the chance to 
(under certain conditions) delay or even obstruct legislation. It is thus an inherently 
ineffective system – set up as to ensure freedom166 more than efficiency.   
Now, it is important to stress that having constitutional provisions which protects and 
favors the status quo is generally considered a good thing in the US, regardless of 
one`s political inclination
167
 (although Nixon
168
 and other presidents have insinuated 
that the Constitution needs to be amended on this point so as to fit into the new era).  
In view of this, the Senate is merely functioning as intended when it acts as a restraint 
against what Thomas A. Birkland (2005:41) has dubbed “policy fads or flash-in-the-
pan social movements”.  
 
There is an additional constitutional hindrance as well. To be precise, it is not a 
hindrance in and of itself, but it is a technical feature of the American system which 
has the practical effect of creating impediments for ratification. I am referring to the 
so-called Supremacy Clause
169
 of the US Constitution. In what many view as one of 
the major flaws of the Constitution, the Supremacy Clause states that "all treaties 
made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the 
supreme law of the land; and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby, any 
thing in the Constitution or laws of any state to the contrary 
notwithstanding”(Wikipedia 2010b). In layman`s terms this translates to [the 
Constitution, federal laws and] treaties taking precedence over state law and that the 
entire judicial branch is bound to adhere to this principle in their court rulings.  
In practice this means that ratification has the automatic effect of opening up for legal 
liability – the crux of the matter, and something to which Americans have always 
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 Freedom in the sense of the Republic not falling into tyranny from within.  
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 Historically based on the premise that it will protect against the creation of tyranny – that ”evil of 
Europe”. Nowadays the justifications for it vary a bit more, from nostalgia, to the desire for consensus 
in sensitive matters, to the US being such a large and heterogenic society etc.   
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 (Schlesinger 2004:252-253) 
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 Article VI, section 2.  
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been hesitant. And as everybody knows, the Congress is
170
 the people, so this extends 
to it as well. Congress has thus become a reluctant and tacit part of the American 
system when it comes to matters pertaining to international accords. More often than 
not it will wait until the judiciary has interpreted the X and made it customary law 
before it ratifies and codifies the X, with all its implications for liability.  
On the one hand, the effects of the Supremacy Clause amount to an extra impediment 
for ratification of treaties. On the other hand, it makes for few treaty violations and 
gives the US a great reputation for treaty compliance [vis-à-vis the treaties it has 
ratified]. The UNCLOS is one of many perfect examples. Even though one has been 
in good compliance with the treaty, one cannot ratify it and partake fully. One is, in 
other words, in good compliance with – not in perfect compliance with.  
It should be noted that the US Supreme Court case of Medellin vs Texas from 2008 
might have seriously rocked the interpretive boat that is the view on the Supremacy 
Clause (FindLaw 2010). I won`t offer an opinion on this extremely contentious 
judicial case, other than to say that it is a good example of the activist role the 
American judiciary assumes at times - whether it ought to or not.  
 
 
4.9 Obama`s window of opportunity 
 
“I will work actively to ensure that the U.S. ratifies the Law of the Sea Convention -- 
an agreement supported by more than 150 countries that will protect our economic 
and security interests while providing an important international collaboration to 
protect the oceans and its resources” – Barack H. Obama 2008 
(Los Angeles Times 2008) 
 
It seems evident that the current President favors ratification.  
 
Interestingly, he sat on the Foreign Relations Committee himself just prior to when 
the UNCLOS was recommended for approval last time, in 2007. He left to join 
another committee, but did several times express his eagerness for the US to join. 
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Vice-president Biden, however, sat on the Committee all through the debate and 
vetting process. In fact, not only did he sit on the Committee at the time; he chaired it.  
The presidential team has, in other words, been exposed to the matter of the UNCLOS 
in previous capacities and has left no doubt as to where it stands. 
 
Although President Obama has not really pushed for ratification yet, there are tell-tale 
signs he might do so. He has staffed his administration with highly UNCLOS-friendly 
people. Apart from the ones already mentioned Top Legal Adviser of the State 
Department, Harold Hongju Koh, is a good example. The former Dean of Yale Law 
School is an acknowledged advocate for international institutions and his educational 
mentor was none other than the late Louis B. Sohn, US delegate to the UNCLOS 
negotiations from 1974 to 1982 and one of the treaty`s primary authors.  
Another example is Anne-Marie Slaughter who sits as Director of Policy Planning at 
the State Department. She is an acknowledged UN-advocate, as evinced in her 2004 
book A New World Order.  
 
The key question is; how much political capital is the White House willing to spend 
on getting the UNCLOS through Senate? 
 
It is futile to try to compare treaties and international engagements. However, if the 
Obama administration was to choose to pursue ratification of one or more 
international treaties as a token of real change (sic), the UNCLOS would certainly be 
a good candidate given its wide support on both sides of the aisle. It doesn`t hurt 
either that the treaty is largely utterly uncontroversial abroad.  
On the other hand, the fact that the healthcare reform was seen through despite fierce 
opposition from the GOP hardliners might make the latter hell-bent on stopping the 
UNCLOS from coming to the Senate floor. Instead of being an accelerant or catalyst 
for more momentum, the [partial] healthcare win might thus have the very opposite 
effect vis-à-vis ideological bills, like the UNCLOS. To the dismay of the many, and to 
the pleasure of the few.  
 
If the will to spend the sufficient political capital is not there at present, the executive 
branch is nonetheless spending financial capital on the UNCLOS issue. Not willing to 
wait for the Senate to give its advice and consent to an accession, it is already in the 
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process of obtaining and compiling the data necessary to establish the outer limits of 
its continental shelf, spending some $5,6 million on the matter in 2008
171
 (Carlson et. 
al. 2009:35). Whether this is to be deemed an act of constitutional treason light or 
merely a responsible preparatory act depends on one`s position on the UNCLOS 
issue, but it nevertheless speaks to a possible future course.  
 
   
5. Conclusions 
 
 began this study by formulating three research questions. I will in the following 
section briefly sum up my findings as relating to each of these three.    
 
 
1: Given that the issue is not a partisan one and that the US secured important 
concessions in the `94 Agreement, why has it nevertheless not yet ratified the 
UNCLOS? 
 
It is indeed quite perplexing that the US is standing outside of the UNCLOS after 
having been profoundly engaged with the regulation of the seas for 200 years.  
Like I have shown, though, it is not because it does not want to – if “it” equals the 
majority. The proponents heavily outweigh the detractors, as they have for quite some 
time, and among the proponents one finds people and interests that very rarely unite. 
That implies that the force hindering US accession must be a strong one. And indeed 
it is. At the very basic level it amounts to the forceful opposition of a select few 
senators and the way in which they are able to maneuver procedurally to hinder the 
bill coming to the floor vote which would surely secure ratification. What is more 
interesting, though, is what informs these detractors, both broadly speaking and with 
specific regard to their arguments for staying out of the UNCLOS. This is the force I 
have humbly sought to describe and attempted to understand.  
To shed light on just that I have chosen to employ the three I`s - interests, ideas and 
identities.  
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Some say that material interests such as limbs, guns or dollar bills are real, whereas 
identities and ideologies are not. That might be the case, but as I have shown 
throughout this thesis, it does not seem to be a particularly valid position when it 
comes to the ambiguous American relationship with the UNCLOS. Quite the 
contrary, identity and ideology seem to shape and define much of it. This is 
particularly the case for the detractors. Although a minority, their opinions and 
arguments actually conform to long-standing strands of US tradition. There is thus 
something American about it - a particular American sense of self and its ideological 
underpinnings, if you will. I have employed their beacon of light Ronald Reagan to 
cast light on the nature of the skepticism. In his era there was indeed a break in the 
process towards a truly international oceanic code and in defense of his decision to 
not sign on to it President Reagan packaged it in much the same way as do the right-
wing hardliners of today. However, interpreting the Reagan stance vis-à-vis the 
UNCLOS is not as easy as a first glance might predicate. 
One should not forget that the amendments President Reagan called for - and 
essentially got in 1994 - were rather pragmatic and sensible – not polemic or overly 
ideological as one might have expected given the public reputation of his 
administration and how his tenure is cheeringly construed by followers in the present. 
This might seem to contradict the spirit of his diary entry so crucial to the GOP 
conservatives in pointing back to their hero from the 1980s.  
Instead of necessarily reading too much into this apparent contradiction, I am inclined 
to attribute it to the dynamic range between personal ideological attitudes on the one 
hand and on the other official decisions and policies, wherein other interests and 
opinions are consulted and/or included.  
 
Given that it treats the UNCLOS as codification of customary international law, one 
could wonder why it is even relevant that the US has not formally ratified it yet.  
At the concrete level it is relevant because it leaves the US without a formal say in 
matters such as those pertaining to continental shelf claims and others. The US was 
granted provisional status after it signed 1994, which meant that it was member of key 
governing bodies while the ratification process at home was on-going. With granting 
this status, the international community was paying heed to the constitutional system 
of the US. The provisional status was only temporary however, and as no advice and 
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consent from the US Senate seemed to be coming, it was revoked in the middle of 
November 1998
172
.  
In addition, it shuts it out from the dispute settlement mechanisms, which in the 
matter of the Northwest Passage would almost certainly represent an advantage to the 
US and serve to force the Canadians in line. It is quite evident that the third-party 
dispute settlement is a troubling part for many Americans. However, one ought not to 
forget the original justifications for including it in the treaty; that the US would 
generally benefit from the certainty, predictability and stability it would help 
facilitate.  
 
At the symbolic level it continues to be a speck on the American multilateral record.   
Sure, UNCLOS detractors are correct in saying that the US enjoys a certain level of 
flexibility under customary international law. When disputes or questions arise, the 
US would as a UNCLOS member state, they would continue, be at the mercy of 
international bodies where the US has a voice – instead of under the flexible state of 
custom where it has a veto. This second level of the abstraction rests on a flawed 
cost/benefit assessment in my view. Under the conditions of the ever-deepening 
interdependencies the assessment of cost changes.  
It will thus be “cheaper” for the US to accede to the UNCLOS than to venture out on 
its own and attempt to replicate the consensus and cooperative will the UNCLOS
173
 
has prepared the ground for. 
Or, to construe the same sentiment in a language more amenable to even the most 
skeptic of the detractors; acceding to the UNCLOS, if not to achieve a certain 
common good, then at least to alleviate the costs of taking unilateral action. 
 
 
2: What role can the Northwest Passage dispute be said to have played? 
 
The dispute is by no means a new one, but it has taken on increased significance due 
to the warming of the climate. It is thus fair to say that the Northwest Passage dispute 
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 The US and the other industrialized nations who had not signed the UNCLOS before the 
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can be taken as a token for an ever-more relevant expectancy in this day in age; as the 
temperature rise, so do the stakes.  
With regard to the legal specificities, the Canadians continue to point to both historic 
title and a straight baseline claim, whereas the Americans refute the entire internal 
waters claim and posits with reference to both the UNCLOS and an ICJ verdict that 
the Passage constitutes an international strait. I have detailed the legal foundations 
underlying the claims of both parties and it seems quite evident that Canada has the 
weaker hand. By saying that the US seems to have a strong case, it goes without 
saying that I would expect that a ratification of the UNCLOS would serve its interests 
nicely, as it would facilitate the dispute settlement mechanism which most likely 
would force the Canadians in line. In addition, by ratifying the US would see a 
fundamental objection the international community has vanish – an international 
community which otherwise favors the American position vis-à-vis the Northwest 
Passage. Two birds with one stone, of sorts.  
 
 
 
3: Going forward, what are the prospects of change? 
 
Keohane & Nye (1977:231) would have called upon the US to assume a “multiple 
leadership” position so as to coax and organize nations around a legal regime for the 
seas. This would imply making certain concessions and foregoing short-term 
bargaining gains in order to reap the benefits of a stable international sea regime in 
the long-run.  
The US was indeed in the process of assuming this very position by its central 
instigative and facilitative role in the process that lead to the enactment of the 
UNCLOS. It jumped off the train though. Or rather, to make the analogy more fitting; 
it never really boarded.   
Although Secretary Clinton as late as in March of this year explicitly reiterated the 
Obama administration`s pledge to see through a ratification at the Chelsea summit, 
the American political landscape might very well preclude such an occurrence for 
quite some time still. My hope is that this thesis has gone a certain way in explaining 
why that is. 
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6. Epilogue 
 
he success of the UNCLOS, I would submit, would seem almost 
unbelievable to those who first began contemplating an international legal 
regime governing the activities of the seas. Pitman Potter writes in 1923;  
“Only when a true international navy comes into existence, subject to international 
control, can all states be sure to enjoy free seas, just as they can be sure of free 
passage in straits only when all shores of straits and fortified ports are demilitarized 
or internationalized” (Potter 1924/2002:245). 
Needless to say, what he envisioned has yet to materialize. True, there is for the first 
time in history a truly global navy, but it is not run internationally. Still, given benign 
intent the seas beyond the EEZ`s are in principle free for all states to enjoy. Most, if 
not all straits and bottlenecks have become open and levy free passage, but this has 
only partially come about through “internationalization”174.  
What we have is a weird albeit functional conjunction of a benign naval 
superpower and the comprehensive international legal framework it more or less 
created
175
 and complies with, but still has not fully acceded to. It can hardly find it 
particularly satisfying, though, to “[at the annual States Parties meeting]...sit as an 
observer in the back of the room, allowed to speak only after every party has had 
their say..and unable to vote…” (Briscoe & Prows 2008:26). 
 
 
 
After having taken a plunge into the legal details of the Northwest Passage dispute it 
seems to me that the US has a strong case, and Canada a rather weak one. Irrespective 
of this, I think Canada would benefit from making a strategic decision soon as to 
where it wants to go. Should it regard the US as a friend or foe in the North? Should 
the two countries collaborate on managing the Northwest Passage and resolve the 
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border dispute in the Beaufort Sea while they are at it? Should they stand united 
against the Russian Bear or keep on looking their separate ways?  
Ironically, it is in fact the Bear that has stood united, albeit not holding hands, with 
Canada on many an Arctic issue through the years. The Soviets were the only ones 
who validated the sector principle (because they made a similar one themselves). The 
Soviets were quick to validate the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act when 
Canada enacted it in 1970 (because they launched their own variant the following 
year).  
For that reason there are those Canadians who would favour real and pragmatic 
cooperation with the Russians. Such cooperation could be as limited or 
comprehensive as one would please, perhaps comprising of some of the following;  
recognition of one another`s claim in the Northwest Passage and the Northern Sea 
Route, Canada buying icebreakers from the Russians, and the two collaborating on 
environmental management of the Arctic. 
On the other hand; Canada and Russia are bound to run into conflict when the 
Canadian claim to the seabed is finalized and sent to the CLCS. It will most likely 
blatantly overlap the Russian one unless negotiations occur and the two respective 
claims are modified
176
.  
And, as mentioned earlier, Russia is still Russia - at worst blatantly distrusted by the 
North Americans, and at best never fully and completely understood.          
On this, the US can see eye to eye with its northern neighbour. In fact, they have 
shown they can do just that in many instances - cooperate. And that goes for issues 
pertaining to ocean law and management as well. The cooperative climate is generally 
good, as it should be between two great neighbours.    
And yet, the dispute over the legal status of the Northwest Passage prevails.  
 
 
 
Seen from the outside it must appear awkward for the US to point to the UNCLOS 
and ICJ in arguing its case vis-à-vis the Northwest Passage – two institutions it has 
had and continues to have problematic relationships with. In fact, and regardless of 
the differences between them, it makes sense comparing the two relationships. Both 
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tell a story of heartfelt and thorough engagement on the one hand, while on the other 
of unwillingness to submit itself to plenary authority and skepticism towards 
consequences which are perceived as adverse to US interests.  
The antinomies are perhaps not so evident from the American side of the 
table. Maybe former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright was on to something when 
she said that Americans tend to look at multilateral ventures
177
 not as ends in and of 
themselves, but as means to promote US virtues and interests in the world (The 
Stanley Foundation 1995:5).  
Whether this facet is something US-specific or something pertaining to the hegemon 
(be it which it may) is a different matter. I would lean toward postulating the latter
178
, 
but seeing as though the hegemon and the US happen to be one and the same now, it 
holds little relevance.  
Having signed but not ratified the UNCLOS, the US would by international 
law by bound to act so as not to defeat the object and purpose of the convention (UN 
2005:8). Or would it? Ironically, the treaty which states as much is yet another one 
that the US has signed but not acceded to – the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties. Still, given that the US felt bound by it, it is a fairly imprecise and 
unenforceable prohibition. As such, the constraints upon US independence in 
maritime matters are thus far strictly speaking only customary international law and 
various bilateral or regional treaties.   
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